Summary
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Joshua Schatz’s ten-year sentence for possessing child pornography, holding that his prior Indiana conviction for child molesting under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) triggers the enhanced mandatory minimum in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). Applying the categorical approach and its precedent in United States v. Liestman, the court held that the Indiana offense broadly relates to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a prior conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) is a conviction relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
- How the categorical approach applies when the federal sentencing benchmark uses the phrase relating to rather than requiring strict element-by-element congruence.
- Whether the least serious conduct realistically punishable under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) bears the required connection to the federal sex-abuse benchmark.
Holdings
- The phrase relating to carries its broad, ordinary meaning and permits some overbreadth between the state offense and the federal sex-abuse offenses; strict congruence is not required.
- The categorical approach requires the court to determine the scope of the federal benchmark, identify the least serious conduct that realistically can be prosecuted under the state statute, and determine whether that conduct bears the necessary connection to the federal benchmark.
- A conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) categorically relates to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward under § 2252A(b)(2), even though the Indiana statute may cover victims older than twelve and conduct between peers under fourteen.
Key quotations
“So long as the least serious conduct under § 3(b) “bears a connection with” and “address[es] the same harm” as federal sex-abuse offenses, application of the enhancement under § 2252A(b)(2) was appropriate.” (9)
“Given how Indiana courts have interpreted the reach of § 3(b), and our own caselaw adopting a broad interpretation of the phrase “relating to” in federal statutes, Schatz’s prior conviction was a categorical match.” (17)
Factual background
Schatz pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). At sentencing, he had a prior Indiana conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) for fondling a two-year-old child. The district court applied the ten-year mandatory minimum in § 2252A(b)(2), although Schatz argued that the Indiana statute was broader than the federal sex-abuse offenses because it could apply to victims under fourteen and lacked certain federal age-difference requirements.
Procedural history
Schatz pleaded guilty to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and preserved his right to appeal the application of the enhanced mandatory minimum under § 2252A(b)(2). The Southern District of Indiana held that his prior conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(b) was a qualifying prior conviction and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.