Daniel Browning, d/b/a Daniel Browning Excavating Co.; Linda Browning v. Craig R. Pendleton, et al.

869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · March 16, 1989 · No. No. 86-4123

Summary

The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Ohio's two-year general personal-injury limitations period under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10 applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than the one-year intentional-tort period in § 2305.11. Relying on Owens v. Okure, the court overruled its prior decision in Mulligan v. Hazard, reversed the judgment on the pleadings, and remanded for determination of the accrual date.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Milburn, Circuit Judge; Engel, Chief Judge; Keith, Circuit Judge; Merritt, Circuit Judge; Kennedy, Circuit Judge; Martin, Circuit Judge; Jones, Circuit Judge; Krupansky, Circuit Judge; Wellford, Circuit Judge; Guy, Circuit Judge; Nelson, Circuit Judge; Ryan, Circuit Judge; Boggs, Circuit Judge; Norris, Circuit Judge; Lively, Senior Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
March 16, 1989
Docket number
No. 86-4123
Procedural posture
Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action was barred by Ohio's one-year intentional-tort limitations period. The Sixth Circuit reheard the case en banc, reversed, and remanded.
Standard of review
The opinion does not expressly state a standard of review for judgment on the pleadings; the appellate court reviewed the legal statute-of-limitations issue de novo and remanded the unresolved accrual issue.
Precedential value
Published en banc Sixth Circuit opinion; binding circuit precedent on the issue addressed, subject to controlling Supreme Court authority.
Parties
Daniel Browning, d/b/a Daniel Browning Excavating Co., Linda Browning v. Craig R. Pendleton, Other defendants-appellees, including Warren County officials
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

section 1983statute of limitationscivil rightsmotion for judgment on the pleadingsappellate procedure

Practice areas

Civil rights litigationStatute of limitationsFederal appellate procedurePleading practice

Questions Presented

  1. Which Ohio statute of limitations must be borrowed for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising in Ohio when Ohio has separate limitations periods for intentional torts and general bodily-injury claims?
  2. Whether the district court could dismiss the action as untimely without determining the accrual date under the applicable two-year limitations period?

Holdings

  1. The applicable limitations period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is the two-year general bodily-injury limitations period in Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10, rather than the one-year intentional-tort period in § 2305.11.
  2. The case could not be resolved on timeliness without determining the accrual date under the applicable two-year period; that issue had to be decided by the district court on remand.

Key quotations

Accordingly, we hold that the appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio is contained in Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2305.10, which requires that actions for bodily injury be filed within two years after their accrual. (991-992)
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Owens, our holding in Mulligan v. Hazard, supra, is hereby overruled. (992)

Factual background

The plaintiffs operated a gravel business in Warren County, Ohio. They alleged that county officials selectively enforced low load limits and failed to maintain roads needed for the business in an effort to force it to close. They further alleged that the conduct caused bankruptcy proceedings and culminated in the sale of the business at a sheriff's sale on October 17, 1983. The action was filed on July 1, 1985, alleging violations of equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural history

The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings after the case was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate recommended granting the motion under Mulligan v. Hazard, and the district court adopted that recommendation on November 7, 1986. The Sixth Circuit granted en banc rehearing to resolve conflicting circuit precedent, reversed the judgment, and remanded for determination of the accrual date and further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The district court must determine the accrual date of the plaintiffs' cause of action under Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10 and conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Court Document

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