Jean Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc.; General Cinema Corporation; Stanley Levin; James Davis

Summary

The Sixth Circuit affirmed a Title VII retaliation verdict for an employee terminated after filing EEOC charges, holding that a prior dismissal with prejudice of a contempt motion under a consent decree did not bar the Title VII claim because it was a dismissal of a motion, not an action. The court also upheld the district court's finding that the employer's absenteeism policy was applied discriminatorily, and that workers' compensation benefits are collateral sources not offset against back pay. The court affirmed dismissal of individual defendants and a parent corporation from the Title VII claim for failure to name them in the EEOC charge, applying the "clear identity of interest" test. Reversing summary judgment on state law claims for retaliatory discharge (Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.90) and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court held those claims were not preempted by LMRA § 301 because they could be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.

Holdings

1. The dismissal of a motion for contempt with prejudice does not bar a subsequent Title VII claim because the motion was not a dismissal of an action under Rule 41, and the contempt proceeding was not adjudicated on the merits.
2. Pepsi failed to meet its burden of production because it had no credible business justification for assigning Knafel burdensome tasks; the only reason was to aggravate her back condition and rid itself of her.
3. The district court's credibility determinations are not clearly erroneous and need not be explicitly stated under Rule 52(a). The record supports the finding that Knafel was singled out for worse treatment.
4. Evidence of pre-consent decree conduct was admissible to show a continuing pattern of discrimination, and the district court properly considered the four-month period after the consent decree as contributing to Knafel's injury.
5. The application of the no-fault policy to penalize Knafel for absences caused by Pepsi's own discrimination constituted unlawful retaliation, not the mere existence of the policy.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding back pay, including the period when Knafel was unable to work because Pepsi caused her injury, and workers' compensation is a collateral source not subject to offset.
7. The dismissal was proper because GCC was not named in the EEOC charge and there was no clear identity of interest with Pepsi; individual defendants were not named at all.
8. The state law claims for retaliatory discharge under Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.90 and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not preempted because they can be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court correctly denied summary judgment on res judicata grounds based on the dismissal of a contempt motion.
2. Whether the district court correctly found that Pepsi failed to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its disparate treatment of Knafel.
3. Whether the district court clearly erred in concluding that Pepsi treated Knafel differently from her co-workers.
4. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Pepsi's disparate treatment caused Knafel's back condition.
5. Whether the district court correctly concluded that Pepsi's no-fault absenteeism policy was applied in a discriminatory manner.
6. Whether the district court's back pay award was appropriate.
7. Whether the district court properly dismissed Title VII claims against General Cinema Corporation, Stanley Levin, and James Davis because they were not named in the EEOC charge.
8. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Knafel's state law claims (retaliatory discharge under Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.90 and intentional infliction of emotional distress) as preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.

Disposition

other