Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing

Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · January 17, 1990

Summary

The Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a)) governs § 1983 claims, rejecting the argument that the five-year residual statute for injury to rights (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.120(6)) should apply. Applying *Wilson v. Garcia* and *Owens v. Okure*, the court reasoned that Kentucky has a single general personal injury statute, not multiple statutes, so the one-year period is the appropriate borrowing. The court also ruled that a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury, not when state administrative or judicial proceedings conclude, and affirmed dismissal of the nurse's untimely challenge to disciplinary action.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Ralph B. Guy, Jr.; Lively; Milburn
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
January 17, 1990
Procedural posture
Appeal from the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on statute of limitations grounds.
Standard of review
De novo review of the statute of limitations determination and accrual issue.
Precedential value
Published
Parties
Margaret Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

civil procedureappellate procedureconstitutional law

Practice areas

Civil RightsStatute of Limitations

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court correctly applied a one-year statute of limitations to Collard's § 1983 claim instead of a five-year statute.
  2. Whether Collard's suit was timely filed within the one-year limitations period.

Holdings

  1. § 1983 actions in Kentucky are governed by the one-year statute of limitations found in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1)(a).
  2. Collard's claims accrued no later than the final Board action in 1983, and the suit filed in 1986 is untimely.

Key quotations

We accordingly hold that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1988 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.
In borrowing statutes of limitations for other federal claims, this Court has generally recognized that the problem of characterization 'is ultimately a question of federal law.' Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1113, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966).
Ever since the Supreme Court made clear in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that '[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked,' id. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482, the federal courts have had to grapple with the interrelationship of state and federal laws.

Factual background

Margaret Collard, a nurse licensed in Kentucky, attempted to stop what she believed was an illegal abortion. Two complaints were filed against her with the Kentucky Board of Nursing. After hearings, the Board placed her on probation for two years and fined her $500 on December 13, 1983. Collard filed a state court action seeking to overturn the Board's decision, claiming constitutional violations. The state circuit court ruled against her, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed on October 4, 1985, finding she was denied due process. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review on January 6, 1986. On March 6, 1986, the Board notified Collard that it would take no further action. She filed this federal § 1983 action on October 9, 1986.

Procedural history

The district court dismissed the action based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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