Summary
This Sixth Circuit opinion addresses a criminal defendant's facial Second Amendment challenges to federal statutes prohibiting firearm possession during drug trafficking crimes. The court found the defendant lacked Article III standing to challenge one dismissed charge but proceeded to evaluate the remaining statute under the Bruen historical analysis framework. Applying this test, the court concluded that regulating firearms used in furtherance of unlawful conduct aligns with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation and affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Risner retained Article III standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the government dismissed that charge pursuant to the plea agreement.
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.
- Whether Risner's as-applied challenges were properly before the court despite the plea agreement's limitation of appellate review to facial challenges.
Holdings
- Risner lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) because dismissal of the charge eliminated his personal stake and no collateral consequences or realistic possibility of recharge preserved the controversy.
- Even assuming Risner had standing, his facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) would fail because the Sixth Circuit had already held that the statute is facially constitutional.
- Section 924(c)(1)(A)'s prohibition on using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime is not facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.
- The court would consider only Risner's facial challenges because his plea agreement specifically limited his appellate right to whether the district court erred in denying those challenges; his as-applied challenges were not before the court.
Key quotations
“Risner faces a heavy burden because he must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [either statute] would be valid.”” (129 F.4th at 363)
“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” (129 F.4th at 366)
“Therefore, we have no reason to depart from Greeno’s holding that the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to the use of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.” (129 F.4th at 368)
Factual background
Between January and November 2022, Risner conspired with two others to distribute methamphetamine in Knott County, Kentucky. Controlled buys and a video transaction showed a pistol near Risner during drug activity, and a search of his residence yielded a pistol, cash, a digital scale, and cell phones. Risner admitted possessing the firearm in connection with drug trafficking.
Procedural history
A federal grand jury indicted Risner and two codefendants on ten counts. The district court denied Risner's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession and firearm-in-furtherance counts. Under a plea agreement, Risner pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and § 924(c)(1)(A) counts, the § 922(g)(1) charge was dismissed, and he retained a limited appellate right concerning the facial challenges. The Sixth Circuit held that Risner lacked standing to challenge the dismissed § 922(g)(1) charge and that his facial challenge to § 924(c)(1)(A) failed on the merits.