Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Thomas Bates’s petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging his criminal convictions and asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court held that a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, rather than extraordinary relief under § 3 or habeas corpus, was the appropriate vehicle for his claims. The court also rejected Bates’s reliance on actual innocence principles under Schlup v. Delo.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, was available when Bates's claims had been or could have been raised on direct appeal and an adequate alternative remedy existed under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.
- Whether a habeas corpus petition was an appropriate vehicle for claims concerning Bates's indictment, trial, conviction, and sentencing.
- Whether an assertion of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo permitted Bates to bypass Massachusetts postconviction procedures.
Holdings
- A petitioner may not obtain extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3 when the claims were or could have been raised on direct appeal and an adequate alternative remedy exists under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30.
- A Rule 30 motion, rather than a petition for habeas corpus, is the proper vehicle for claims relating to a criminal indictment, trial, conviction, or sentencing when the petitioner is incarcerated pursuant to those convictions.
- An assertion of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo does not permit a petitioner to disregard established state postconviction procedures when the petitioner is merely being directed to use the appropriate procedural vehicle.
Key quotations
“The Supreme Court’s holding in Schlup v. Delo, supra, does not permit a petitioner to disregard a State’s established postconviction procedures — or render the State powerless to insist on compliance with its procedures — whenever a claim of actual innocence is made.” (1021)
“The petitioner’s “claim of [actual] innocence is thus ‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’ ”” (1021)
Factual background
Bates was convicted in 1991 of multiple offenses involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children and adults. After the Appeals Court affirmed most of his convictions and the denial of a new trial, Bates pursued collateral relief through a G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition. He also asserted actual innocence, but supported that assertion only with a brief, self-serving affidavit and sought to avoid the Commonwealth's established postconviction procedures.
Procedural history
Bates was convicted in 1991 of numerous sexual offenses. The Appeals Court affirmed all but three convictions and affirmed the denial of his motion for a new trial. In 1999, Bates filed a G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition in the county court raising challenges that largely had been or could have been raised on direct appeal; a single justice denied relief, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Bates had also filed a habeas petition in the Superior Court, but the court dismissed it.