Commonwealth v. Brum

Summary

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree arising from the killing and robbery of a seventy-nine-year-old shop owner. The court rejected challenges concerning the admission of the defendant’s postarrest statement, the handling of his invocation of the right to remain silent, the admission of portions of a codefendant’s statement, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the requested felony-murder instruction. The court also declined to exercise its authority under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial.

Holdings

1. The defendant's invocation of his right to terminate questioning during the first interview did not require suppression of his later postarrest statement because the first interview was noncustodial and the defendant was released before the second custodial interrogation.
2. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights during the second interview despite the officers' refusal to permit his brother to participate.
3. The defendant's spontaneous, unprovoked remark after he invoked his right to remain silent was admissible, and the trial judge properly denied the motion for a mistrial.
4. The admitted portions of the codefendant's statement were nonhearsay because they were offered to show that the statements were made and to support the inference that the brothers had contrived identical false accounts; their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
5. The prosecutor's argument that the defendant sought money from the victim to buy drugs was permissible because it was fairly inferable from the evidence, and the sarcastic phrasing did not mislead the jury into believing it was a verbatim quotation.
6. The defendant was not entitled to an instruction on second-degree felony-murder predicated on larceny from the person because his theory that the larceny was an afterthought defeated the required causal connection between the felony and the homicide.
7. The improper references to the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
8. The erroneous description of the burden of proof for voluntary manslaughter did not warrant relief because there was no evidence supporting provocation or self-defense and therefore no likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the defendant's postarrest confession was obtained in violation of his right to remain silent because police failed to scrupulously honor his earlier decision to terminate questioning.
2. Whether the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights during the second interview was involuntary because police refused his request to have his brother present.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in denying a mistrial after the jury heard the defendant's spontaneous remark made after he invoked his right to remain silent.
4. Whether limited portions of the nontestifying codefendant's statement were inadmissible hearsay or violated the defendant's confrontation rights.
5. Whether the prosecutor's closing argument improperly asserted that the defendant sought money from the victim to buy drugs.
6. Whether the defendant was entitled to an instruction on second-degree felony-murder predicated on larceny from the person.
7. Whether unpreserved references to the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent and an erroneous voluntary-manslaughter burden-of-proof instruction warranted relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Disposition

affirmed