Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction. The court held that police had probable cause to seize and obtain warrants for the defendant's truck and clothing, and that the warrant affidavit supported probable cause to search the truck. The court also found several improper but nonprejudicial prosecutorial remarks and declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether police had probable cause to seize the defendant's truck without a warrant while obtaining a search warrant.
- Whether police had probable cause to seize the defendant's clothing without a warrant.
- Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant for the truck established probable cause to believe evidence of kidnapping or marijuana possession would be found in the truck.
- Whether challenged portions of the prosecutor's closing argument created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or obtain particular forensic evidence.
- Whether the victim's diaries were properly excluded under the Massachusetts rape-shield statute.
- Whether relief was warranted under the Supreme Judicial Court's extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- The police lawfully seized the truck because probable cause supported the belief that it contained evidence concerning the victim's kidnapping or disappearance and the seizure was reasonably necessary to prevent destruction or removal of evidence while a warrant was obtained.
- The warrantless seizure of the defendant's clothing was supported by probable cause.
- The affidavit established probable cause to search the defendant's truck for evidence of kidnapping and possession of marijuana and to search the defendant's clothing for related evidence.
- Several challenged statements in the prosecutor's closing argument were improper, but none created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice warranting reversal.
- The defendant did not establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to investigate drug-induced lupus or obtain epithelial-cell testing of the victim's shorts.
- The trial judge properly excluded the victim's diaries under G. L. c. 233, § 21B, because the proposed use concerned the victim's alleged sexual predisposition and had little or no permissible probative value.
Key quotations
“With probable cause, the police may seize property “to prevent destruction or removal of evidence during the relatively short period of time needed ... to obtain a search warrant.”” (437 Mass. at 573)
“The officers must have entertained rationally ‘more than a suspicion of criminal involvement, something definite and substantial, but not a prima facie case of the commission of a crime, let alone a case beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (437 Mass. at 573)
“An affidavit must contain enough information for an issuing magistrate to determine that the items sought are related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that they reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time the search warrant issues.” (437 Mass. at 579)
“Characterizing the defense tactic as “despicable” goes beyond labeling it as unworthy of belief or lacking in merit and smacks more of an ad hominem attack.” (437 Mass. at 581)
“It is settled that “the victim’s consent to intercourse with one man does not imply her consent in the case of another.”” (437 Mass. at 583)
Factual background
The victim accepted a ride in the defendant's truck after being unable to start her automobile and disappeared before reaching a planned meeting in Brockton. The defendant was the last person known to have been with her, gave inconsistent accounts of their movements, and could not account for approximately eight hours. Police observed a suspected blood stain and injuries on the defendant and later found a mixture of the victim's blood and the defendant's semen on a tarp in the truck and on the victim's bathing suit.
Procedural history
The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder predicated on aggravated rape. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his truck and clothing and admitted evidence challenged under the rape-shield statute. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and declined to order a new trial under its extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.