Commonwealth v. Rodriguez

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Rolando Rodriguez’s conviction for murder in the first degree based on felony-murder and affirmed the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected challenges concerning the presumption of innocence, expert-witness instructions and testimony, prosecutorial argument and questioning, appeals to juror sympathy, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction.

Holdings

1. A jury instruction that must be read as a whole adequately conveys that the presumption of innocence continues unless and until the Commonwealth proves every element beyond a reasonable doubt, even if some wording suggesting that the presumption may begin to disappear when evidence is introduced is not preferred.
2. An instruction that permits the jury to rely on an expert opinion based on assumed facts only if the jury finds those facts proven does not improperly shift the burden of proof when the charge as a whole repeatedly places the burden of proving specific intent on the Commonwealth.
3. On cross-examination of an opposing expert, hypothetical questions using 'consistent with' and 'could have' language are not inadmissible merely because they do not expressly ask for an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
4. There was no reversible error where the prosecutor abandoned a question implicating consciousness-of-guilt evidence before the expert answered and the judge properly instructed the jury on the limited use of such evidence.
5. A prosecutor may argue facts in evidence and reasonable inferences from them, including that a baseball cap served as a disguise and that a bag was associated with the robbery, when the evidence supports those inferences.
6. A prosecutor may provide limited background about the victim and refer to the victim's family to humanize the proceedings and set the scene, so long as the references are not excessive or the focal point of the argument.
7. An ineffective-assistance claim based solely on counsel's failure to object to conduct that was not erroneous cannot succeed.
8. After reviewing the entire record, the court found no basis to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt in the interests of justice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and evaluation of expert testimony improperly shifted the burden of proof.
2. Whether the prosecutor elicited inadmissible consciousness-of-guilt evidence or otherwise failed to satisfy the applicable standard for expert testimony during cross-examination of the defense expert.
3. Whether the prosecutor improperly assumed facts not in evidence or argued facts and inferences not supported by the evidence.
4. Whether the prosecutor improperly appealed to juror sympathy by referring to the victim's husband and children.
5. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to or move to strike challenged instructions and prosecutorial statements or for failing to request curative instructions.
6. Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt.

Disposition

affirmed