Fabre v. Walton

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a party has a right to interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute. The court further held that Walton’s abuse protection petition and supporting affidavits were petitioning activities protected by the statute and that Fabre’s abuse-of-process claim was based solely on those activities. The court reversed the denial of Walton’s motion and awarded her entitlement to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Holdings

1. A defendant has a right to interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed under G. L. c. 231, § 59H.
2. An interlocutory appeal from the denial of a special anti-SLAPP motion should proceed to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, regardless of the court in which the SLAPP suit originated.
3. Walton's filing of the abuse-prevention complaint and submission of supporting affidavits were protected petitioning activities, and Fabre's abuse-of-process claim was based on those activities alone.
4. Fabre failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Walton's petitioning activity was devoid of any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law.
5. Because Walton's special motion to dismiss should have been allowed, she was entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees for the District Court proceedings and could seek fees and costs for the appeal.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a defendant may obtain interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute.
2. Whether Walton's application for and participation in the G. L. c. 209A abuse-prevention proceeding constituted petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute and whether Fabre's abuse-of-process claim had a substantial basis apart from that petitioning activity.
3. Whether Fabre met his burden to show that Walton's petitioning activity was devoid of any reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law despite the final abuse-prevention judgment in Walton's favor.
4. Whether Walton was entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded