Commonwealth v. Colon

439 Mass. 519 (2003) · Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts · June 6, 2003

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant presented sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut the presumption that his 1994 guilty-plea proceeding was valid. Because the Commonwealth failed to establish that the plea colloquy adequately protected the defendant’s constitutional rights, the court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial, set aside the finding of guilt, and remanded for further proceedings.

Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Writing for the Court
Ireland, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
June 6, 2003
Procedural posture
The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw a 1994 guilty plea. The Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.
Standard of review
A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, but reversal is warranted when the ruling is manifestly unjust or the proceeding was infected with prejudicial constitutional error. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the motion judge's application of the burden-shifting framework governing challenges to the validity of an old guilty plea in a sentencing-enhancement context.
Precedential value
Published Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Colon v. Commonwealth
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

post-conviction reliefplea bargainingcriminal proceduredue process

Practice areas

criminal procedurepost-conviction reliefconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the defendant presented sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut the presumption that his 1994 guilty plea was valid when no recording of that plea existed.
  2. Whether, after the defendant rebutted the presumption of regularity, the Commonwealth proved that the 1994 plea proceeding protected the defendant's constitutional rights.
  3. Whether a constitutionally inadequate guilty-plea colloquy requires withdrawal of the plea without a separate showing of specific prejudice or that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty had a proper colloquy occurred.
  4. Whether a written jury-waiver form cured deficiencies in the oral plea colloquy.

Holdings

  1. The defendant presented sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut the presumption that the 1994 guilty plea proceeding was valid.
  2. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the defendant's 1994 plea proceeding was constitutionally adequate.
  3. A defendant who establishes that the guilty-plea colloquy was constitutionally inadequate need not make an additional showing of specific harm or that the defendant would have gone to trial.
  4. A written jury-waiver form does not substitute for the oral, on-the-record advisements required during a guilty-plea colloquy and does not cure constitutional defects in that colloquy.

Key quotations

The plea colloquy, as reconstructed, is grossly inadequate as a matter of constitutional law as well as under our rules of criminal procedure. (439 Mass. at 526)
A defendant’s plea is not entered into ‘freely and understandingly’ unless he comprehends the nature of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. (439 Mass. at 529)
The defendant need not make any further showing in order to withdraw his plea. (439 Mass. at 529-530)

Factual background

The defendant pleaded guilty in the Holyoke District Court in 1994 to assault and battery, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and threatening offenses, and later pleaded guilty in 1996 to, among other offenses, possession of a firearm. In 1999, he was indicted on firearm charges carrying enhanced penalties for repeat offenders and sought to vacate the earlier convictions. The recording of the 1996 plea and recordings of six randomly selected plea colloquies conducted by the same judge showed a substantially consistent and constitutionally deficient practice, including failure to establish that defendants understood the charges, their elements, the maximum penalties, and the rights waived by pleading guilty. The 1994 recording was unavailable, so the defendant relied on the judge's customary practice, recordings of other proceedings, and testimony from attorneys who observed the judge's plea colloquies.

Procedural history

After being indicted in Superior Court in 1999 on firearm charges carrying enhanced repeat-offender penalties, the defendant moved under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) to vacate convictions resulting from guilty pleas entered in 1994 and 1996. A motion judge allowed relief as to the 1996 plea but denied relief as to the 1994 plea. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial concerning the 1994 plea. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, set aside the finding of guilty, and remanded for further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The judgment denying the motion for a new trial was reversed, the finding of guilty was set aside, and the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Court Document

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