Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the intoxication instruction, viewed in context and under the applicable standard of review, did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. It also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of an evidentiary hearing, and entitlement to relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge's intoxication instructions adequately permitted the jury to consider alcohol and drug consumption when evaluating deliberate premeditation, malice, and extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- Whether the failure to specifically instruct that the jury could consider the combined effects of Artane and alcohol created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing adequately to investigate or pursue a diminished-capacity defense based on Tourette's Syndrome, intoxication, and possible organic brain deficits.
- Whether the motion judge abused her discretion by denying the new-trial motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
- Whether the omission of a Ciampa-type cautionary instruction concerning the credibility of a cooperating witness warranted a new trial.
- Whether the court should reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- An intoxication instruction is legally adequate when it tells the jury that it may consider credible evidence of alcohol or drug consumption in determining whether the Commonwealth proved the defendant's relevant state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction given adequately addressed deliberate premeditation and malice.
- The trial judge erred by failing specifically to instruct the jury that it could consider intoxication among the circumstances bearing on whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- The failure to instruct specifically that the jury could consider the combined effects of Artane and alcohol did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Trial counsel was not ineffective because the decision to forgo a Tourette's Syndrome-based diminished-capacity defense and instead rely principally on voluntary intoxication was a reasonable strategic decision and was not manifestly unreasonable.
- The motion judge did not abuse her discretion by deciding the ineffective-assistance claim without an evidentiary hearing because the motion and affidavits did not raise a substantial issue concerning counsel's performance.
- The omission of a cautionary instruction concerning the credibility of cooperating witness Francis Albis did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- There was no basis to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial under the court's extraordinary review power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Key quotations
“All that we have ever required be said to juries about the effect of drug [including alcohol] consumption on a defendant's intent or knowledge would be satisfied by a simple instruction that the jury may consider credible evidence of the effects of the defendant's consumption of drugs [or alcohol, or both] in deciding whether the Commonwealth had met its burden of proving the defendant's state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt.” (17)
“We agree that his strategy was not manifestly unreasonable. As such, it cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” (22)
Factual background
The defendant and Francis Albis consumed approximately ten alcoholic drinks each over seven hours, and the defendant also took two Artane pills prescribed for Tourette's Syndrome. After the defendant became angry at David Champagne over an alleged assault on the defendant's cousin, the defendant attacked Champagne and stabbed him twenty-two times, causing fatal injuries. After the killing, the defendant threatened witnesses, attempted to prevent them from contacting police, washed the knife, and told others that he would escape responsibility because he had Tourette's Syndrome. Expert testimony attributed the defendant's alleged inability to form the required mental states to the combined effects of alcohol and Artane.
Procedural history
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the preserved and unpreserved claims, applied the substantial-likelihood-of-a-miscarriage-of-justice standard where appropriate, affirmed the conviction and the order denying a new trial, and declined to reduce the degree of guilt under § 33E.