Commonwealth v. Stewart

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Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to sever Stewart's trial from Hendricks's trial despite allegedly mutually antagonistic defenses.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Stewart's conviction on a theory of principal liability for deliberate-premeditation murder.
3. Whether the admission of statements made to Hendricks violated the rules governing adoptive admissions or statements by joint criminal venturers, and whether the error was prejudicial.
4. Whether the judge improperly admitted testimony concerning a prosecutor's question about a witness's visit to the victim's grave.
5. Whether Stewart was denied meaningful cross-examination and confrontation rights because a Commonwealth witness testified that psychiatric problems affected her memory and truthfulness.
6. Whether evidence of Stewart's threats and prior conduct involving Vaughan was improperly admitted as prior-bad-acts evidence.
7. Whether the prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses during closing argument.
8. Whether the judge was required to conduct individual voir dire after jurors might have seen Stewart in the lockup.
9. Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
10. Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial.

Holdings

1. Severance is required when jointly tried defendants' defenses are mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable and the resulting prejudice is so compelling that it prevents a fair trial. Even assuming Stewart's and Hendricks's defenses were inconsistent or mutually exclusive, severance was not required because the Commonwealth presented substantial independent evidence supporting Stewart's guilt.
2. The evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stewart was the principal shooter and committed first-degree murder by deliberate premeditation.
3. The trial court erred by admitting testimony concerning statements made to Hendricks without instructing the jury on the prerequisites for using statements by a joint criminal venturer against Stewart. The error was nonprejudicial because the properly admitted evidence of Stewart's guilt was overwhelming.
4. The testimony concerning whether a Commonwealth witness had visited the victim's grave was irrelevant and inadmissible, but its admission did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because it concerned a minor collateral matter and was not objected to.
5. Stewart was not denied his confrontation rights because the witness admitted on cross-examination that her testimony lacked credibility, thereby allowing the defense to obtain all that could reasonably have been gained through cross-examination.
6. Evidence that Stewart threatened Bergstrom and her daughter was admissible to show his hostile state of mind toward Vaughan and possible motive, rather than propensity. Evidence concerning the reason for Hendricks's hostility was improperly admitted as an opinion about another person's state of mind, but the error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative.
7. The prosecutor's statement that he had taken pains to review the record did not constitute improper vouching because it did not express a personal belief in witness credibility or claim knowledge independent of the evidence.
8. The trial judge followed the required procedure by first determining whether the potential extraneous influence raised a serious question of possible prejudice and then questioning the jury collectively. Because no juror indicated exposure, no individual voir dire was required.
9. Stewart failed to establish ineffective assistance because the challenged actions or omissions did not deprive him of a material defense benefit and the record showed that counsel investigated, prepared, litigated motions, and presented substantial impeachment and defense evidence.
10. The court declined to reduce the verdict or order a new trial under its extraordinary power because, considering the errors cumulatively and the strong evidence of guilt, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.

Key quotations

Factual background

Jennifer Perkins was shot and killed while sitting in her Jeep outside a friend's home in East Falmouth. The evidence showed that Stewart and codefendant Milteer Hendricks had previously targeted Perkins's boyfriend, Tony Vaughan, and that Stewart had searched for Vaughan, possessed a nine-millimeter handgun, and expressed hostility toward him. An eyewitness testified that both Stewart and Hendricks shot toward the vehicle, and other witnesses testified about Stewart's incriminating statements, concealment of the gun, and efforts to dispose of clothing and other evidence. Police later recovered the nine-millimeter handgun and a towel from a wooded area after Stewart directed them there.

Procedural history

A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial after an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the murder conviction and the order denying a new trial and declined to exercise its extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.