Summary
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Lord Hampton's convictions for the murders of a fourteen-year-old victim and her fetus. The court held that the defendant was not formally arrested until after completing his recorded statement, so any violation of his statutory right to use a telephone did not require suppression. The court also held that the denial of access to criminal records of all jurors did not constitute structural error or a constitutional due process violation.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Hampton's statement had to be suppressed because police failed to advise him promptly of, or permit him promptly to use, a telephone under G. L. c. 276, § 33A.
- Whether the defendant's request for CORI records of all jurors after the jury had been sworn raised structural error or violated due process.
- Whether the trial judge acted within her discretion in addressing juror misconduct and discharging juror A after the jury had been sworn.
- Whether relief was warranted under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- A defendant's statutory right to use a telephone under G. L. c. 276, § 33A, is triggered by formal arrest, not merely by custodial or prearrest interrogation. Because Hampton was not arrested until after his recorded statement ended, and he failed to show an intentional violation connected to obtaining the statement, suppression was unwarranted.
- The denial of a defendant's request for criminal records of all jurors after the jury has been sworn is not structural error absent a showing of actual or implied juror bias. Criminal records of jurors are not an indispensable constitutional means of selecting an impartial jury.
- After a jury is sworn, a prosecutor may not independently conduct CORI checks to investigate whether jurors failed to disclose criminal records without the trial judge's approval, unless the prosecutor reserved that entitlement before the jury was sworn and completes the checks no later than the beginning of the next trial day.
- The trial judge acted within her discretion in discharging juror A for violating the court's no-discussion order and in retaining juror B after determining through individual voir dire that B's nondisclosure was unintentional and did not establish bias or incompetence.
Key quotations
“On a claim of structural error alleging that a jury were not impartial because a particular juror was biased, the defendant must show actual or implied juror bias.” (457 Mass. at 163)
“That said, criminal records of prospective jurors do not enjoy such a history, and they are not an indispensable or necessary means to the selection of an impartial jury, as a matter of Federal or Massachusetts constitutional law.” (457 Mass. at 165)
“After empanelment of the jury, unless the prosecutor has reserved an entitlement to conduct such a check, any check of CORI records or other inquiry into juror misconduct, whether sought by the prosecution or the defendant, may be done only with the approval of the trial judge.” (457 Mass. at 171)
Factual background
Police interviewed Hampton at Boston police headquarters on November 4, 1999, after he voluntarily accompanied detectives and received Miranda warnings. He gave a tape-recorded statement describing his participation in burying the victim alive after Kyle Bryant stabbed her; police obtained authorization to arrest Hampton only after the recorded interview ended. Hampton was later convicted of murdering the victim and her fetus. During trial, after the jury had been sworn, the prosecutor obtained CORI records for several jurors based on their facial reactions, and the judge discharged one juror for violating a no-discussion order while retaining another after individual voir dire.
Procedural history
Hampton was convicted of the murders of a fourteen-year-old girl and her eight-month-old fetus. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress his police statement and denied his request for CORI records concerning jurors after the jury had been sworn. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.