Commonwealth v. McCowen

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Christopher M. McCowen's convictions for murder in the first degree, aggravated rape, and aggravated burglary, as well as the denial of his motions for a new trial. The court rejected challenges concerning Miranda waivers and statement voluntariness, grand jury integrity, venue and juror sequestration, evidentiary rulings, juror discharge, nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, and alleged juror racial bias. The court also declined to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

1. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and his postarrest statements were voluntary.
2. A grand juror's knowledge of the victim and members of her family, without evidence of egregious bias or prejudice affecting the indictment, does not require further inquiry, disqualification, or dismissal of the indictments.
3. Dismissal of an indictment requires proof that false or deceptive evidence was knowingly presented for the purpose of obtaining the indictment and was material to probable cause in a way that probably made a difference in the grand jury's decision; the defendant failed to make that showing.
4. The trial judge acted within his discretion in denying a change of venue and initially declining to sequester the jury, while later sequestering the jury when circumstances changed.
5. Admission of the unavailable medical examiner's testimonial factual findings and opinion through a substitute examiner was constitutional error, but the unpreserved error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
6. The DNA analyst's expert opinions were admissible, but raw allele numbers generated by a nontestifying analyst were testimonial hearsay admitted in error; the unpreserved error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
7. A deliberating juror may be discharged for a palpable conflict and compelling reason, and the trial judge acted within his discretion in removing the juror whose close companion was arrested and prosecuted by the same district attorney's office and who violated sequestration and no-contact orders.
8. When a defendant presents a credible claim that a juror made a statement reasonably suggesting racial or ethnic bias, the trial judge must determine whether the statement was made, whether the juror was actually biased, and, if actual bias is not established, whether the statement infected deliberations and prejudiced the defendant's right to an impartial jury.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and whether his postarrest statements were voluntary.
2. Whether the indictments should have been dismissed because a grand juror knew the victim and because the Commonwealth allegedly presented false or incomplete evidence to the grand jury.
3. Whether denial of a change of venue or full-trial sequestration deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial jury.
4. Whether evidentiary errors involving prior bad acts, substitute medical-examiner testimony, DNA testimony, and the defendant's statements to a defense expert required a new trial.
5. Whether the trial judge properly discharged a deliberating juror for a palpable conflict and compelling reason.
6. Whether alleged nondisclosure of criminal-history information, laboratory reports, or other exculpatory evidence required a new trial.
7. Whether alleged racial or ethnic bias among jurors deprived the defendant of an impartial jury.
8. Whether the convictions or degree of guilt should be reduced under the Supreme Judicial Court's extraordinary review authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Disposition

affirmed