Commonwealth v. Morgan

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed Joseph Morgan’s convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses arising from an attempted armed robbery. The court upheld the denial of Morgan’s motion to suppress statements, the admission of prior-bad-act evidence, and the limitation on third-party culprit evidence. It found no reversible error and declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.

Holdings

1. A statement made outside the six-hour arraignment safe-harbor period is admissible when the defendant has made an informed and voluntary written waiver of the right to prompt arraignment, and custodial status alone does not establish psychological coercion or invalidate the waiver.
2. Evidence of Morgan’s prior vehicle break-ins and thefts was properly admitted because it was relevant to his motive for participating in the robbery and was not admitted to prove criminal propensity.
3. The trial judge properly excluded testimony about Jesse Do’s prior armed robberies because the evidence lacked substantial connecting links to the charged shooting and was too remote and speculative.
4. The evidence did not warrant a voluntary drug-intoxication instruction, and counsel’s failure to request such an instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. The court found no basis to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial under its extraordinary review authority.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Morgan’s statements were inadmissible because his written waiver of the right to prompt arraignment under Commonwealth v. Rosario was involuntary due to psychological coercion arising from the delay before arraignment.
2. Whether evidence that Morgan previously broke into motor vehicles and stole valuables was inadmissible prior-bad-act evidence or was properly admitted for the limited purpose of proving motive.
3. Whether the trial judge improperly excluded testimony concerning Jesse Do’s prior armed robberies as third-party culprit evidence.
4. Whether the evidence warranted a voluntary drug-intoxication jury instruction and whether trial counsel’s failure to request one created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
5. Whether relief was warranted under the Supreme Judicial Court’s plenary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Disposition

affirmed