Commonwealth v. Petetabella

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial filed nearly forty-four years after his murder conviction. The court held that the matter was an appeal from a collateral attack rather than a direct appeal and rejected claims concerning waiver of appellate rights, jury selection, shackling, courtroom noise, and allegedly burden-shifting jury instructions.

Holdings

1. A Rule 30(b) motion filed after conviction and sentencing is a collateral attack on a final conviction, and Petetabella's failure to pursue a direct appeal was a knowing and voluntary waiver rather than the product of ineffective assistance.
2. The challenged presumption-of-innocence instruction was not structural error and, when read in the context of the entire charge, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
3. The jury-selection process did not constitute structural error or unconstitutional exclusion of women because the trial judge did not actually select a man over a woman for the unused fourteenth seat, and the defendant had no right to more than twelve jurors.
4. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by using stringent courtroom-security precautions, including shackles and armed security, in light of the defendant's execution-style killing and the customs and practices existing at the time.
5. The challenged felony-murder instructions did not relieve the Commonwealth of proving the intent required for armed robbery, and the challenged use of 'find' in the intoxication instruction was not error when the charge was read as a whole. Any Sandstrom-type error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
6. Petetabella was not entitled to a new trial based on alleged coercion to testify because the motion judge reasonably discredited his testimony and the trial record showed that the judge explained the privilege and that Petetabella knowingly chose to testify.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Petetabella's failure to pursue a direct appeal resulted from ineffective assistance or an involuntary waiver such that the court should treat the matter as a direct appeal and conduct plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
2. Whether the trial was infected with structural or constitutional error because of the presumption-of-innocence instruction, the exclusion of women from the jury, the use of shackles and armed security, or courtroom noise.
3. Whether the felony-murder and intoxication instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, including whether the challenged felony-murder language constituted Sandstrom error.
4. Whether Petetabella was coerced into testifying and therefore entitled to a new trial.

Disposition

affirmed