Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interprets a homeowner’s policy exclusion for bodily injury resulting from an insured’s “intentional and criminal acts.” It holds that a guilty plea to general-intent crimes does not, by itself, eliminate the insurer’s duty to defend because the plea lacks preclusive effect. The court further holds that if the insurer breached its duty to defend and the insured defaulted, the insurer may be bound by the underlying complaint’s factual allegations of negligence when determining its indemnity obligation, and remands for further proceedings.
Holdings
- An exclusion for bodily injury resulting from an insured's intentional and criminal acts applies when the insured intended to commit the conduct that caused the injury and that conduct was criminal; it does not require proof that the insured intended the resulting harm.
- A guilty plea resulting in a criminal conviction does not conclusively establish that a policy exclusion applies and does not, by itself, eliminate an insurer's duty to defend.
- When an insurer breaches its duty to defend and the insured defaults in the underlying action, the insurer is bound by the factual allegations in the complaint establishing negligence when determining whether it owes indemnification, unless another coverage issue remains that is not inconsistent with negligence.
Questions Presented
- Whether a homeowner's liability-policy exclusion for bodily injury resulting from an insured's intentional and criminal acts applies when the insured intended the conduct causing the injury and the conduct was criminal, without proof that the insured intended the resulting harm.
- Whether an insurer owes a duty to defend when the underlying complaint alleges negligence or recklessness that is reasonably susceptible of coverage, even though the insured pleaded guilty to general-intent crimes arising from the same incident.
- Whether an insurer that breaches its duty to defend is bound by the factual allegations establishing the insured's negligence when the insured defaults in the underlying action, for purposes of determining the insurer's duty to indemnify.
Disposition
vacated
Cases Cited (27)
- A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 445 Mass. 502, 518, 527 (2005)(followed)
- Ruggerio Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 794, 796 (2000)(followed)
- Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 406 Mass. 7, 10-11 (1989)(followed)
- Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. Co., 393 Mass. 37, 40 (1984)(followed)
- Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 319 (1983)(followed)
- Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Topsham, 441 A.2d 1012, 1015 (Me. 1982)(followed)
- Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 394-395 (2003)(followed)
- Timpson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 347 (1996)(followed)
- Billings v. Commerce Ins. Co., 458 Mass. 194, 200-201, 205 (2010)(followed)
- Sarnafil, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 418 Mass. 295, 304 (1994)(followed)
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Cited In (0)
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Court Document
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