Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for murder in the second degree and related firearms offenses after a retrial following a hung jury. The court held that the second trial’s instruction on accessory or joint venture liability did not violate double jeopardy protections, and it rejected challenges concerning gang-affiliation evidence and juror impartiality. Although certain substitute medical examiner testimony was improperly admitted as hearsay, the error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether double-jeopardy protections barred the retrial court from instructing the jury on joint-venture or accessory liability when the first trial jury had not received that instruction.
- Whether evidence of the defendant's gang affiliation was improperly admitted.
- Whether testimony by a substitute medical examiner concerning facts and data from a nontestifying examiner's autopsy report violated the defendant's confrontation and hearsay rights and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether the trial judge abused discretion by retaining a juror who had a vague, longstanding acquaintance with a prosecution witness.
Holdings
- Double-jeopardy protections did not bar the second-trial judge from giving a complete murder instruction that included liability based on knowing participation in the crime, even though the first-trial judge had omitted a joint-venture instruction.
- The trial judge did not abuse discretion by admitting limited evidence of the defendant's gang affiliation because it was relevant to motive and potential joint-venture liability, and the judge took steps to reduce prejudice.
- Although the substitute medical examiner improperly testified to facts, data, and conclusions from the nontestifying examiner's autopsy materials, the error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
- The trial judge did not abuse discretion by declining to excuse a juror whose vague recollection was that a testifying trooper might once have been his student or athlete, because the record did not establish probable bias or a distinct bias.
Key quotations
“Liability as a principal and liability as an accomplice are not distinct theories of liability for the jury or the prosecutor to choose between.” (475)
“Consistent with the Sixth Amendment and traditional protections against hearsay, however, a substitute medical examiner may not testify on direct examination to the facts, data, and conclusions stated in an autopsy report.” (479)
“The tenuous prior acquaintance between the trooper and juror no. 16 did not require that the juror be excused.” (481)
Factual background
On April 7, 2007, several bullets were fired into a window at a Lowell residence, killing Vuthavy Phay. The defendant, who was romantically involved with a resident of the house, belonged to a gang rival to the gang associated with her brother and others at the residence. A witness testified that the defendant shot into the window, while another witness saw him with a gun immediately afterward but did not see who fired the shots.
Procedural history
A grand jury indicted the defendant for murder in the first degree and firearms offenses. His first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury reported that it was hopelessly and truly deadlocked. At the retrial, the jury convicted him of murder in the second degree and each firearms charge. The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review and affirmed.