Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder was entitled to the benefit of Miller v. Alabama and Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District. Because life without parole could not be imposed, the court applied severability principles to require a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole under the parole eligibility statute in effect when the crime was committed. The case was remanded for sentencing proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Miller v. Alabama applies to Brown because his criminal case was not final when Miller was decided.
- Whether a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree may be sentenced to life without parole under Miller and Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District.
- What sentence may be imposed when the statutory provision mandating life without parole for first-degree murder is unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile.
- Whether Miller or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires discretionary sentencing for juvenile offenders in circumstances other than imposition of life without parole.
Holdings
- Miller v. Alabama applies to Brown because his criminal case was pending and nonfinal when Miller was issued; under Massachusetts law, a criminal judgment is not final until sentence is imposed.
- Brown may not be sentenced to life without parole. Miller bars the mandatory imposition of that sentence on juvenile homicide offenders, and Diatchenko independently holds that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
- A juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, with parole eligibility determined under the version of G. L. c. 127, § 133A, in effect when the crime was committed.
- Neither Miller nor Diatchenko prohibits mandatory sentencing for juveniles in all circumstances; constitutional discretion is required here because the sentence at issue is life without parole, not because every juvenile sentence must be discretionary.
Key quotations
“We now hold that Brown is entitled to the benefit of Miller and Diatchenko and that he may not be sentenced to life without parole.” (677-678)
“Thus, Brown, who has been convicted of murder in the first degree, must be sentenced under G. L. c. 265, § 2.” (688-689)
“What remains of G. L. c. 265, § 2, for Brown, then, is a mandatory sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole.” (689)
Factual background
Brown was seventeen when he participated in the June 20, 2009, killing of Tyriffe Lewis. In August 2012, he was tried and convicted in the Superior Court of murder in the first degree and three related weapons charges. He had not yet been sentenced when the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, and his conviction therefore remained nonfinal under Massachusetts law.
Procedural history
Brown was convicted in the Superior Court of murder in the first degree and three related weapons charges for a homicide committed when he was seventeen. Sentencing was stayed after Miller v. Alabama was decided. The Superior Court judge denied the Commonwealth's request to report questions to the Appeals Court and indicated that she would apply severability principles to impose life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The Commonwealth sought relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and a single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full Supreme Judicial Court.
Remand instructions
The county court must enter judgment denying the Commonwealth's petition for relief and remand the case to the Superior Court for sentencing proceedings consistent with the opinion. Brown must receive mandatory life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, with parole eligibility governed by the applicable version of G. L. c. 127, § 133A.