Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Commonwealth may pursue an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution from a determination that a claimant is eligible to seek compensation under the erroneous convictions statute, G. L. c. 258D. The court further held that eligibility is not limited to convictions reversed because exculpatory evidence was omitted, but requires reversal on grounds resting on facts and circumstances probative of the claimant’s innocence. Applying that standard, the court concluded that Irwin was not eligible because his conviction was reversed based on the improper use of his prearrest silence as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Commonwealth may pursue an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution from an order determining that a claimant is eligible to pursue relief under G. L. c. 258D.
- Whether a conviction reversed because the Commonwealth improperly introduced and emphasized the defendant's prearrest silence as consciousness-of-guilt evidence was reversed on grounds that tend to establish the defendant's innocence under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii).
Holdings
- The Commonwealth may pursue an interlocutory appeal from an order determining eligibility under the erroneous convictions statute because the statute's waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to claimants who establish eligibility, and eligibility is a collateral issue concerning immunity from suit.
- A claimant need not show that the conviction was reversed solely because exculpatory evidence was omitted; grounds for reversal may qualify if they rest on facts and circumstances probative of the proposition that the claimant did not commit the crime. However, Irwin was not eligible because exclusion of the nonprobative but prejudicial evidence of his prearrest silence did not make it more likely that he did not commit the offense.
- Evidence of a defendant's prearrest silence may be admitted to establish consciousness of guilt only when it would be reasonable to expect an ordinary person to speak, and may be used for impeachment only when it would have been natural for a person in the circumstances to speak; a defendant who does not open the door may not be cross-examined about refusing to participate in a police interview.
Key quotations
“An interlocutory order may be appealed under the doctrine of present execution “if the order will interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from a final judgment.”” (at 841)
“Rather, “grounds which tend to establish” a plaintiff’s innocence require that a conviction be overturned “on grounds resting upon facts and circumstances probative of the proposition that the claimant did not commit the crime.”” (at 844)
““While we agree that the eligibility requirements of [G.] c. 258D were intended to limit the class of persons entitled to pursue relief, and in this sense perform a screening function, and that the relief granted must be on grounds tending to do more than merely assist the defendant’s chances of acquittal, we do not discern a legislative intent that the determination of eligibility be tantamount to a testing of the merits of a claimant’s case.”” (at 847)
Factual background
Irwin was convicted after a trial in which the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized his delay in responding to police requests for an interview and argued that an innocent person would have come forward immediately. The Appeals Court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that use of Irwin's prearrest silence as consciousness-of-guilt evidence violated common-law evidentiary principles and his privilege against self-incrimination. The Commonwealth later entered a nolle prosequi, and Irwin sought statutory compensation for an erroneous felony conviction.
Procedural history
Irwin's conviction for indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen was vacated by the Appeals Court, which ordered a new trial because the Commonwealth improperly used his prearrest silence as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi in August 2009. Irwin then filed a compensation action under G. L. c. 258D. The Superior Court ruled that he was eligible to pursue the claim, and the Commonwealth appealed interlocutorily.
Remand instructions
The orders denying the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and allowing Irwin's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings were vacated and set aside. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment for the Commonwealth.