Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Robert Wade satisfied the statutory requirement for postconviction DNA testing under G. L. c. 278A by showing that the requested analysis had not been developed at the time of his conviction. The court ruled that a petitioner need establish only one of the statute’s enumerated reasons for the absence of prior testing and need not prove a separate “primary” or “actual” reason. It also held that Wade’s motion did not waive attorney-client privilege concerning trial counsel’s reasons for not seeking DNA testing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether G. L. c. 278A requires a postconviction testing applicant to establish only one of the statute's five enumerated reasons why requested testing was not previously conducted, or also requires proof that the selected reason was the primary or actual reason.
- Whether a motion for DNA testing under the undeveloped-analysis prong requires the applicant to establish that a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the testing.
- Whether filing a motion under G. L. c. 278A places attorney-client communications concerning the reasons trial counsel did not seek testing at issue and thereby waives the attorney-client privilege.
- Whether the evidence supported the finding that the requested DNA analysis had not been developed at the time of Wade's conviction.
Holdings
- Under G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b) (3), a moving party satisfies the requirement concerning why testing was not previously conducted by establishing any one of the alternative reasons listed in § 3 (b) (5); the party need not establish multiple reasons.
- G. L. c. 278A does not require a moving party to prove the primary or actual reason that testing was not previously conducted.
- A moving party who establishes that the requested analysis had not yet been developed at the time of conviction need not also establish that a reasonably effective attorney would have sought the analysis.
- Wade did not waive the attorney-client privilege by filing a motion under G. L. c. 278A, and the motion to strike privileged communications disclosed by trial counsel should have been allowed.
- The evidence supported the finding that the requested DNA analysis had not been developed when Wade was convicted, so Wade satisfied G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (5) (i).
Key quotations
“The plain meaning of the phrase "for any of the reasons" is that the requirement is satisfied when any one of the several enumerated alternatives is met.” (475 Mass. at 11-12)
“The act lists five alternative reasons on which a party may rely to show why testing was not performed. It contains no requirement that a moving party prove "the primary reason" among them.” (475 Mass. at 16)
“We conclude that Wade did not effect an "at issue" waiver by filing his petition, and his motion to strike all privileged communications disclosed by trial counsel should have been allowed.” (475 Mass. at 20)
Factual background
Wade was convicted in 1997 of first-degree murder under a felony-murder theory based on aggravated rape. He sought testing of biological material from samples taken from the victim's vagina and clothing, requesting modern DNA analysis of thirteen CODIS short tandem repeat loci. Wade's expert testified that the requested analysis, with substantially greater discriminatory power than the testing available in 1997, had not yet been developed at the time of conviction. During the evidentiary hearing, the judge compelled Wade's trial counsel to disclose privileged communications concerning Wade's encounter with the victim and denied Wade's motion to strike that testimony.
Procedural history
A Superior Court jury convicted Wade of murder in the first degree on a felony-murder theory predicated on aggravated rape. After prior proceedings, including Wade II, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on Wade's motion for DNA testing. The motion judge found that the requested analysis had not been developed at the time of conviction but denied relief on the ground that Wade also had to establish that this was the primary reason the evidence had not been tested and that a reasonably effective attorney would have sought testing. The judge also compelled and considered privileged communications from Wade's trial counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed both orders and remanded with instructions to order the testing.
Remand instructions
The Superior Court must enter an order that the requested scientific analysis be conducted forthwith and conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion.