Summary
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a § 1983 action, holding that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for acts as a witness (e.g., presenting false affidavits) in malicious prosecution claims, reversing dismissal of contempt-related claims against prosecutor Melnick. The court affirmed dismissal of other malicious prosecution claims based on prosecutorial or qualified immunity, abuse of process claims as time-barred under Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations, excessive force claims for lack of personal participation, and Monell claims for failure to allege a municipal policy or custom. The court also held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner excessive force claims and that judicial factfinding on exhaustion is permissible, affirming the district court’s finding that Mr. Carbajal failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Mr. Carbajal had accumulated three PLRA strikes requiring prepayment of the filing fee.
- Whether the malicious prosecution claim against prosecutor Melnick for contempt charges was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
- Whether the malicious prosecution claim against prosecutors for the burglary charge was barred by absolute immunity.
- Whether the malicious prosecution claim against Detective Hagan was barred by qualified immunity.
- Whether the abuse of process claims were time-barred.
- Whether the excessive force claims against prosecutor Mullin and investigator Watts were properly dismissed.
- Whether the district court erred in denying leave to amend.
- Whether the Monell claims were properly dismissed.
- Whether the district court erred in finding that Mr. Carbajal failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Holdings
- Prosecutorial immunity does not extend to a prosecutor's acts as a witness, such as presenting false information in an affidavit to secure arrest warrants.
- The prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken within the continuum of initiating and presenting a criminal case, including filing additional charges and presenting testimony.
- Detective Hagan is entitled to qualified immunity because Mr. Carbajal failed to allege specific facts showing that Hagan misrepresented or concealed facts from the prosecutor.
- The abuse of process claims based on the 'shell' cases and the burglary charge are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
- The excessive force claims against Mullin and Watts were properly dismissed because the complaint failed to allege that they personally participated in the use of force or took any actions in furtherance of a conspiracy.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because further amendment would be futile given plaintiffs' repeated failure to cure deficiencies.
- The Monell claims against the City and County of Denver and the District Attorney were properly dismissed because the complaint contained only conclusory allegations of policy or custom, and the DA's office is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
- The district court's finding that Mr. Carbajal failed to exhaust his administrative remedies is not clearly erroneous, and his appeal from that finding does not present a substantial question.
Key quotations
“A malicious-prosecution claim is not cognizable until all the elements are satisfied.” (at 9)
“State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity against suits brought pursuant to § 1983 for activities intimately associated with the judicial process, such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.” (at 10)
“The Supreme Court held in Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–31 (1997), that prosecutors do not have absolute prosecutorial immunity for their acts as a witness.” (at 11)
“A municipality is not liable solely because its employees caused injury. Rather, a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim must show 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom and 2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” (at 23)
“the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” (at 26)
Factual background
This case stems from Colorado's criminal prosecution of Dean Carbajal in 2010-2011. He was convicted of multiple charges but acquitted of one burglary charge. Plaintiffs (Dean Carbajal, his mother Victoria Carbajal, and family friend Luis Leal) brought a wide-ranging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against police, prosecutors, judicial officers, and others for their alleged roles in connection with the burglary charge and other related actions. Key events include the filing of 'shell' cases that were dismissed, an alleged excessive force incident by Deputy Keefer, the filing of contempt charges against Victoria Carbajal and Luis Leal, and the addition of a burglary charge in February 2011.
Procedural history
The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss most claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and later dismissed the remaining excessive force claim against Deputy Keefer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiffs appealed.
Remand instructions
Remand for further proceedings on the malicious prosecution claim brought by Ms. Carbajal and Mr. Leal against prosecutor Melnick related to the contempt of court charges.