Summary
Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), and the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Davis* (invalidating the residual clause) does not affect that holding. The defendant was convicted of completed Hobbs Act robbery, not attempted robbery, so arguments about attempted Hobbs Act robbery were irrelevant. A Rule 60(b) motion challenging a § 924(j)(1) murder conviction based on *United States v. Melgar-Cabrera* was properly dismissed as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. The Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability because no reasonable jurist would find the district court's rulings debatable.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis.
- Whether Mr. Kayarath was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery (not a crime of violence) rather than completed Hobbs Act robbery.
- Whether the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Kayarath's Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized second or successive §2255 motion.
Holdings
- Hobbs Act robbery categorically is a crime of violence under the elements clause of §924(c)(3), and Davis does not affect that conclusion. Therefore, no reasonable jurist would find the district court's ruling debatable or wrong.
- The record shows Mr. Kayarath was indicted for, and found guilty of, robbery, not attempted robbery. No reasonable jurist would find the district court's ruling debatable or wrong.
- The district court correctly dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion for lack of jurisdiction because it was in substance a second or successive §2255 motion that had not been authorized by this court.
Key quotations
“we held in Melgar-Cabrera that Hobbs Act robbery categorically 'is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3).'” (5)
“we therefore hold that because the offense of Hobbs Act robbery has as an element the use or threatened use of physical force capable of causing injury to a person or property, a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery categorically constitutes a 'crime of violence' under section 924(c)'s [elements] clause.” (5)
“This language alleges robbery; it cannot reasonably be construed as alleging attempted robbery.” (7)
Factual background
Mr. Kayarath was convicted of one count of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence causing death (murder) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). He was sentenced to life imprisonment. He later sought to challenge his conviction under §924(j)(1) arguing that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under §924(c) after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis invalidated the residual clause. He also argued that the indictment charged him with attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which is not a crime of violence.
Procedural history
Mr. Kayarath was convicted in 1997 of Hobbs Act robbery and §924(j)(1) murder. His first §2255 motion was denied in 2001. In 2016, he sought authorization for a second/successive §2255 motion based on United States v. Davis, which was granted in January 2020. He then filed a §2255 motion arguing Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence after Davis, and a Rule 60(b) motion arguing his conviction is void under United States v. Melgar-Cabrera. The district court denied both motions and denied a COA.