Summary
The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District at Austin, reviews an appeal from an order terminating a father's parental rights and approving a stepparent adoption. The court holds that the father raised genuine issues of material fact concerning whether termination was in the child's best interest, reverses the termination order, and remands for further proceedings. The opinion also rejects the father's challenge to opposing counsel's disqualification.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to disqualify Stepfather's counsel based on an alleged conflict arising from the county attorney's role in representing the Department in other matters.
- Whether the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment terminating Father's parental rights because competing evidence created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether termination was in Sarah's best interest.
- Whether the timing of the amended petition and admission of a CPS letter violated Father's due-process rights.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Father's motion for new trial or motion to vacate based on newly discovered evidence.
Holdings
- The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify Stepfather's counsel because Father did not establish with specificity a disciplinary-rule violation or demonstrate actual prejudice requiring the severe remedy of disqualification.
- Summary judgment terminating Father's parental rights was improper because the summary-judgment evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether termination was in Sarah's best interest.
- The district court did not violate Father's due-process rights by allowing Stepfather to amend the petition to allege Father's aggravated-sexual-assault conviction because Father failed to show surprise or prejudice.
Key quotations
“On a cold summary judgment record, without having observed a single witness, it would take keen insight to forecast accurately whether probative evidence would or would not produce a “firm belief or conviction” in the mind of the trier of fact.” (15-16)
“After weighing the competing evidence provided by the parties, a factfinder could ultimately conclude that there is, but that should occur following a trial, not on summary judgment.” (19-20)
Factual background
Father was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and witness tampering and received concurrent prison sentences, with parole eligibility projected for 2036. Sarah had lived primarily with Stepfather, who had been married to Sarah's mother, and an adoptive home study conducted while Mother was alive supported Stepfather's home and the proposed adoption. After Mother's death, Father, Grandmother, and Reta Peel submitted evidence concerning alleged substance use and unsafe conditions in Stepfather's home, CPS reports, Sarah's relationship with Grandmother and Peel, and an alternative placement plan with them.
Procedural history
Stepfather sought termination of Father's parental rights and adoption of Sarah. The district court granted Stepfather's motion for partial summary judgment on termination and later granted the adoption after a final hearing. Father's earlier appeal from the interlocutory summary-judgment order was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. After the district court clarified that the adoption order was final and appealable, Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed the termination and adoption order and remanded for trial on the best-interest issue.
Remand instructions
The district court must conduct a trial on whether termination of Father's parental rights is in Sarah's best interest. Trial must commence no later than 180 days after issuance of the mandate.