Rose v. Bartle

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Questions Presented

1. Whether the district court provided adequate notice before converting Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions into motions for summary judgment.
2. Whether the plaintiffs' allegations against prosecutors for suborning perjury were barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
3. Whether alleged disclosures of secret grand jury information were absolutely immune and, independently, whether the disclosures stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. When the plaintiffs' § 1983 malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, and conspiracy claims accrued for statute-of-limitations purposes.
5. Whether the grand jury presentment and alleged probable cause required dismissal of the § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.
6. Whether the complaints adequately pleaded civil RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (c), and (d).
7. Whether a RICO enterprise may also be a RICO person when it is alleged to be both the victim of some racketeering activity and the perpetrator of other racketeering activity.

Holdings

1. A district court may not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion into a summary judgment motion without unambiguous notice of the conversion and a reasonable opportunity to submit materials pertinent to Rule 56. The ambiguous notices in these cases required review under a Rule 12(b)(6)-equivalent standard.
2. In the Third Circuit, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim accrues when the underlying criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff's favor because favorable termination is an element of the constitutional tort.
3. The plaintiffs' § 1983 false arrest and abuse-of-process claims accrued when the alleged arrests occurred, because the plaintiffs then had reason to know of the injuries encompassed by those torts.
4. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for alleged solicitation or coercion of perjured testimony when the conduct concerns testimony prepared for use in grand jury proceedings and is part of the prosecutors' advocacy function.
5. The mere fact that alleged disclosure of grand jury information occurred during a grand jury proceeding does not establish absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court must apply a functional analysis to determine the role in which the prosecutor acted.
6. A grand jury presentment ordinarily provides prima facie evidence of probable cause, but plaintiffs may overcome that effect by specifically alleging that the presentment was procured by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. General allegations that witnesses perjured themselves or that the presentment was falsified were insufficient, but Rose, Hill, and Kolimaga were entitled to seek amendment.
7. A civil RICO claim under § 1962(a) requires injury caused by the use or investment of racketeering income in the enterprise, not merely injury caused by the predicate racketeering acts. The plaintiffs' § 1962(a) allegations were insufficient and could not be cured by amendment.
8. An entity is not categorically barred from being both a RICO enterprise and a RICO person when the allegations treat it as the victim of some racketeering activity and as the perpetrator of other racketeering activity.
9. The plaintiffs adequately pleaded predicate acts of bribery and extortion and a pattern of racketeering activity under § 1962(c), and their allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage even though they would require proof through discovery and trial.
10. The plaintiffs adequately pleaded RICO conspiracy claims where the complaints identified the general composition and objectives of the conspiracy, specified time frames, described acts taken to achieve its objectives, and incorporated factual allegations supporting the conspiracy.

Key quotations

Factual background

The plaintiffs were employees or former employees of the Montgomery County sheriff's office who were implicated in grand jury presentments concerning alleged political fund-raising and other criminal activity in the sheriff's office. Criminal charges were brought against them, but the charges were dismissed or the plaintiffs were acquitted. The plaintiffs alleged that county and Republican Party officials conspired to use politically motivated prosecutions and corrupt grand jury proceedings to remove them from office and influence county patronage.

Procedural history

The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, RICO, and pendent state law. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania notified the parties that it would consider pleadings and documentary or sworn attachments in deciding the pending motions, but did not clearly notify them that the motions would be converted to summary judgment motions. The district court dismissed the claims. The Third Circuit affirmed some dismissals, reversed others, vacated additional dismissals, and remanded for further proceedings and possible amendment.

Remand instructions

The cases were remanded for further proceedings. Rose, Hill, and Kolimaga could seek to amend their § 1983 malicious prosecution and conspiracy-to-maliciously-prosecute claims to plead with specificity that the grand jury presentment was procured by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. The district court was instructed not to revisit the dismissed § 1962(a) claims or the conclusion that macing could not constitute RICO racketeering activity. The § 1962(c) and § 1962(d) claims against Asher, Bartle, and the Republican Party could not again be dismissed as insufficient on the pleadings. If summary judgment were later considered, the parties had to receive a reasonable opportunity for discovery and to submit materials. The district court could exercise pendent jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.