Summary
**Topics:** Consent decree enforcement; continuing subject matter jurisdiction; "active jurisdiction" clause; substantial compliance standard; individualized obligations to class members; funding condition defense. **Holding:** The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of substantial noncompliance with the Final Settlement Agreement by Pennsylvania and two counties. The court held that the district court retained continuing jurisdiction to enforce the permanent Appendix A orders because the settlement agreement's "active jurisdiction" clause meant cessation of active supervision, not loss of jurisdiction. The court further ruled that substantial compliance must be measured by services to each individual class member, not the class as a whole, and that a county's funding condition defense fails if the county could have used provided funds to satisfy settlement obligations first.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Final Settlement Agreement after the dates specified for cessation of 'active jurisdiction'.
- Whether the district court erred in finding the Commonwealth, Montgomery County, and Delaware County in substantial noncompliance with the Final Settlement Agreement.
Holdings
- The district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Appendix A obligations, which are permanent court orders. The term 'active jurisdiction' means the court ceases active supervision but retains jurisdiction over the permanent orders.
- The district court's findings of substantial noncompliance are not clearly erroneous. The Commonwealth is jointly responsible for services and failed to enforce compliance; Montgomery County's compliance is measured individually, not by class percentage; Delaware County's funding defense fails because funding was sufficient for class members.
Key quotations
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Final Settlement Agreement is APPROVED, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the provisions of the Final Settlement Agreement executed on July 12, 1984 heretofore made a part of the record in this case shall have the full force and effect of an order of this Court.” (321)
“Subject to paragraphs 15 and 16 below, the parties agree that as of the dates specified in those paragraphs, the District Court will mark this case closed and settled, will vacate the judgment and all orders of the Court except those in Appendix A, which shall remain in effect permanently (subject to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)), and will cease to have active jurisdiction of this case....” (322)
“there is no question, I think I made that absolutely clear, if you are violating any orders in the Appendix, ... which are permanent orders, there is no question. And that--why label them permanent? What would have been the sense of a Court issuing orders that if the orders were only to be in effect for two years or three years? What kind of relief would that have been for the members of the class? That would have been a farce.” (323)
Factual background
The Pennhurst State School and Hospital was a facility for retarded individuals. In 1974, a class action was filed alleging inadequate care. After years of litigation, a Final Settlement Agreement (FSA) was reached in 1984, requiring the Commonwealth and counties to provide community living arrangements and habilitative services. The FSA imposed obligations on the Commonwealth and counties, including individual planning, monitoring, and permanent court orders in Appendix A. In 1989, the Association for Retarded Citizens/Pennsylvania moved for enforcement, alleging noncompliance. The district court found that 68 class members from Delaware County and 6 from Montgomery County were not receiving required services, and that the Commonwealth failed to monitor and enforce compliance.
Procedural history
The Pennhurst litigation began in 1974. After years of litigation, a Final Settlement Agreement (FSA) was reached in 1984 and approved by the district court in 1985. In March 1989, ARC/PA moved for enforcement. The district court held evidentiary hearings and found the Commonwealth, Montgomery County, and Delaware County in substantial noncompliance. The court ordered monthly reports and compliance by March 1, 1990. Appellants timely appealed.