Summary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Christopher Thieme’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of good conduct time under the First Step Act. The Court held that the Act requires prorating good conduct time for a partial final year of a sentence and rejected Thieme’s related due process, Administrative Procedure Act, and separation-of-powers arguments. The Court also noted that Chevron deference was unavailable following Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), as amended by the First Step Act, requires the BOP to prorate good-conduct-time credit for a partial final year of a prisoner's sentence.
- Whether the BOP's rulemaking or calculation violated procedural due process.
- Whether the Administrative Procedure Act permitted review of the BOP's rule or Thieme's individualized release-date calculation.
- Whether the District Court's alternative reliance on Chevron deference required reversal after Loper Bright overruled Chevron.
- Whether Thieme's challenge to rounding down partial credit days was preserved.
Holdings
- Section 3624(b)(1), as amended by the First Step Act, sets good-conduct-time credit at a rate of up to 54 days for each year of the sentence imposed and requires credit for a partial final year to be calculated on a prorated basis. The BOP therefore correctly calculated 26 days for Thieme's final approximately six months.
- Thieme did not state a viable procedural due process claim because he challenged the BOP's rulemaking rather than a denial of credits based on an adjudicative determination concerning his individual conduct.
- The APA challenge to the BOP's regulation was premature because the regulation was not final agency action when Thieme filed suit. Although the individualized recalculation was final agency action, 18 U.S.C. § 3625 precludes APA judicial review of determinations, decisions, or orders made under the relevant Sentencing Reform Act subchapter, including § 3624(b)(1).
- The District Court's alternative reliance on Chevron does not affect the judgment because Chevron deference was overruled by Loper Bright; the result instead rests on the court's independent interpretation of § 3624(b)(1).
- The Court would not consider Thieme's separate challenge to the BOP's rounding down of partial credit days because he raised it for the first time in his reply brief in the District Court and did not include it in his petition or seek to amend the petition.
Key quotations
“Thus, despite the First Step Act’s deletion of the term ‘prorated,’ its other amendments preserve the proration process for the final portion of a year of a prisoner’s sentence.” (17)
“And there is no such ambiguity here. As explained above, the natural reading of the statute is that good conduct time credits accrue at the rate of 54 days per year and credit for partial years of confinement are determined on a prorated basis.” (18)
Factual background
Christopher Thieme began serving a 210-month federal sentence on December 19, 2016. After the First Step Act, the BOP recalculated his potential good-conduct-time credits as 944 days, including 26 prorated days for the final approximately six months of his sentence. Thieme contended that he was entitled to the full 54 days for that final period, which would have produced 28 additional days of credit and an earlier potential release.
Procedural history
Thieme, serving a 210-month federal sentence, filed a pro se § 2241 petition in the District of New Jersey challenging the BOP's proration of good-conduct-time credits for the final six months of his sentence and asserting statutory, due process, Administrative Procedure Act, and separation-of-powers claims. The District Court denied the petition, holding that § 3624(b)(1) plainly permits proration and alternatively upholding the BOP's interpretation under Chevron. The Third Circuit appointed amicus counsel, reviewed the pure legal question de novo, and affirmed.