Summary
The Third Circuit reviews a summary judgment ruling in a racial and religious discrimination action arising from the Borough of Bergenfield’s promotion of a police chief. Predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the court concludes that New Jersey’s Background Circumstances Rule is incompatible with the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The court holds that genuine disputes of material fact regarding discriminatory motive and the defendants’ asserted justifications require a trial on the NJLAD claim, while affirming other aspects of the District Court’s ruling.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether New Jersey's Background Circumstances Rule remains applicable to reverse-discrimination claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination after Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services.
- Whether genuine disputes of material fact regarding discriminatory intent and pretext precluded summary judgment on Massey's NJLAD failure-to-promote claim.
- Whether an employment discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may proceed when based on an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
- Whether Massey's § 1981 claim against the municipality could proceed under a Monell theory.
Holdings
- The Background Circumstances Rule is incompatible with the NJLAD's text and, in light of Ames, the Supreme Court of New Jersey would conclude that the Rule has no permissible role in NJLAD litigation.
- Massey presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie NJLAD failure-to-promote claim and to create genuine disputes regarding defendants' justifications and discriminatory intent; he was entitled to a trial.
- An employment discrimination claim under § 1983 may proceed when it is based on an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and genuine factual disputes precluded summary judgment on Massey's claim.
- Massey's § 1981 claim was properly dismissed because it was not structured as a § 1983 claim predicated on a Monell theory.
Key quotations
“For all of these reasons, we are confident that the Supreme Court of New Jersey would once again conclude that “it is in the best interests of everyone concerned to have some uniformity in the law” and thus interpret the identical text in the NJLAD in the same manner that the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Title VII.” (11-12)
“It will be up to a jury to sort that out, but nothing more was required of Plaintiff at the prima facie stage.” (14)
“To spell it out: A Monell theory against a municipality “arising under § 1981,” id., is a § 1983 claim relying on a Monell theory predicated on a violation of one of the rights established in § 1981.” (25-26)
Factual background
Christopher Massey, a white male, served in the Bergenfield Police Department from 1995, eventually becoming Deputy Chief and acting Officer In Charge. After the incumbent Chief retired in 2019, the Borough Council considered Massey and Mustafa Rabboh, an Arab-Muslim Captain, for the position and voted to promote Rabboh. The record included evidence that officials considered Rabboh's race and religion, referred to the importance of a minority department head, and made comments that could support an inference of discriminatory intent. Defendants offered qualifications, interview performance, long-term strategy, continuity, and diversity as explanations for the promotion.
Procedural history
Massey sued the Borough and five Councilmembers for racial and religious discrimination under the NJLAD, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After discovery and unsuccessful settlement discussions, the District Court granted defendants summary judgment in September 2024, concluding that Massey failed to satisfy New Jersey's Background Circumstances Rule and failed to rebut defendants' stated reasons, that his § 1983 theory was unavailable for employment discrimination, and that § 1981 did not provide a private cause of action. The Third Circuit reversed as to the NJLAD and § 1983 claims, affirmed as to the § 1981 claim, and remanded.
Remand instructions
Remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion, including trial proceedings on the NJLAD and § 1983 Equal Protection claims. The District Court's judgment remains affirmed as to the § 1981 claim.