Corey R. Kendig v. Nicholas Stolar

No. 24-2260 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · April 28, 2026 · No. No. 24-2260

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Pennsylvania State Trooper Nicholas Stolar in Corey Kendig’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. The court held that known facts conclusively supporting self-defense can be relevant exculpatory information that should be included in a probable-cause affidavit, but qualified immunity applied because the duty was not clearly established when Stolar acted.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Writing for the Court
Roth, Circuit Judge; Montgomery-Reeves, Circuit Judge; Ambro, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decision date
April 28, 2026
Docket number
No. 24-2260
Procedural posture
Kendig appealed the Western District of Pennsylvania's grant of summary judgment to Trooper Nicholas Stolar on Kendig's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for Fourth Amendment false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Stolar asserted qualified immunity.
Standard of review
The Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Qualified immunity was analyzed by asking whether the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct.
Precedential value
precedential
Parties
Corey R. Kendig v. Nicholas Stolar, Pennsylvania State Police
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

qualified immunityfourth amendmentprobable causesection 1983summary judgment

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightscriminal procedurequalified immunityappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether known facts supporting Kendig's self-defense claim were relevant and required to be included in the affidavit of probable cause for the charged offenses.
  2. Whether omitting known facts supporting self-defense violated Kendig's Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest, detention, and prosecution without probable cause.
  3. Whether that Fourth Amendment right was clearly established when Stolar prepared the affidavit, defeating qualified immunity.
  4. Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Stolar.

Holdings

  1. An affirmative defense is relevant to a probable-cause determination when a reasonable police officer would conclusively know that the defense either negates the charged offense's requisite mental state or excuses the conduct. For the offenses charged here, known facts establishing self-defense were exculpatory and relevant to the magistrate's probable-cause determination.
  2. An officer is not required to evaluate the merits of every potential affirmative defense, investigate facts that might establish a defense, or resolve conflicting evidence. But when the officer gathers information bearing on self-defense and conclusively knows that the defense negates the charged offense's mens rea or excuses the conduct, the officer must provide those facts to the magistrate.
  3. The omission of known facts establishing Kendig's self-defense implicated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from charges and arrests without probable cause.
  4. Stolar was entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of his conduct, it was not clearly established in the Third Circuit that omitting facts supporting an affirmative defense from a probable-cause affidavit violated the Fourth Amendment.

Key quotations

[A]n affirmative defense [is] considered relevant to a probable cause determination only when a reasonable police officer . . . would “conclusively know” that the affirmative defense either negates the requisite mental state or excuses the offending conduct. (14-15)
Our holding here is straightforward: An officer is not required to evaluate the merits of every potential affirmative defense before filing charges or making an arrest. But when the officer gathers information bearing on the validity of the affirmative defense of self-defense, which he conclusively knows negates the requisite mental state of the charged offense or excuses the offending conduct, he must provide that information to the magistrate so that the probable cause determination remains with the magistrate judge, not the officer. (19-21)
Still, the law as it stood at the time of the incident provided Stolar no “clearly established” reason to believe that excluding this information from his affidavit of probable cause would violate Kendig’s legal rights. He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. (21)

Factual background

After Jeremy Jones and his friends confronted Corey Kendig outside Partner's Tavern, one of Jones's friends punched Kendig and a physical altercation followed. While Kendig was on the ground in a chokehold, he fired a gun, striking Jones, who later died. Trooper Nicholas Stolar investigated the shooting, interviewed witnesses, reviewed video footage, filed search-warrant applications, and charged Kendig with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person. Kendig was later acquitted, and the record contained evidence that could support a self-defense theory.

Procedural history

After Kendig was arrested and charged in connection with Jeremy Jones's shooting death, a jury acquitted him of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person. Kendig then sued Stolar and the Pennsylvania State Police under § 1983. The District Court granted Stolar summary judgment, concluding that Kendig had not shown arrest, detention, or charging without probable cause and that Stolar was entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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