Jafarnia Williams v. Superintendent Rockview SCI; Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Jafarnia Williams · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · June 15, 2026 · No. No. 23-1306

Summary

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Jafarnia Williams’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen the dismissal of his habeas petition. The court held that the untimely claim of mistake could not be recast under Rule 60(b)(6), and that a change in procedural case law, without supporting extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship, was insufficient for relief. The court also concluded that remand was unnecessary because Williams had not properly presented facts supporting equitable relief.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Writing for the Court
Judge Bibas; Judge Restrepo; Judge Fisher
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decision date
June 15, 2026
Docket number
No. 23-1306
Procedural posture
Williams appealed the Western District of Pennsylvania's denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion seeking to reopen the dismissal of a second-in-time federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed.
Standard of review
The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, including grounds not reached by the District Court, and may determine from the appellate record that extraordinary circumstances cannot be shown as a matter of law.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Parties
Jafarnia Williams, a/k/a Jeff Schirone Williams v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

federal habeas corpussuccessive petitionspost-conviction reliefmotion for reconsiderationappellate procedure

Practice areas

Federal habeas corpusPost-conviction reliefAppellate procedureCivil procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen a final habeas judgment may be granted when the movant relies principally on a subsequent procedural interpretation of existing law.
  2. Whether the District Court's failure to expressly weigh the equitable factors relevant to Rule 60(b)(6) required a remand.
  3. Whether Williams's Rule 60(b)(1) motion was timely and, if not, whether it could properly succeed under Rule 60(b)(6).

Holdings

  1. A change in law, without supporting equitable circumstances, does not by itself establish the extraordinary circumstances or extreme and unexpected hardship required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. A new precedent may be one factor, but it cannot be the dispositive factor unless it falls within a recognized retroactivity exception.
  2. Remand was not required because the appellate record established as a matter of law that Williams could not show extraordinary circumstances.
  3. Williams's Rule 60(b)(1) claim was untimely, and the motion could not be recast as a successful Rule 60(b)(6) motion because it alleged only an asserted legal mistake based on a later procedural interpretation and no exceptional circumstances.

Key quotations

Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow circumstances; its standard is “stringent” and “very strict.” (5)
But it cannot suffice as the dispositive factor, amounting to extraordinary circumstances all on its own, unless it falls within a retroactivity exception. (7)
Under 60(b)(6), that is insufficient as a matter of law. (10)

Factual background

Williams was convicted in Pennsylvania in 2007 and sentenced to fifteen to thirty years in prison. After collateral proceedings concerning time-served credit, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas issued a 2013 document modifying his sentence, and the Superior Court affirmed the current sentence while leaving the credit intact. Williams later filed a federal habeas petition challenging his convictions and a sentence enhancement, arguing that the 2013 modification was a new judgment under Magwood; that petition was dismissed as second or successive. Years later, he sought to reopen that dismissal based on subsequent Third Circuit precedent, but his motion alleged no hardship, extraordinary circumstances, diligence, actual innocence, death sentence, or developed merits showing.

Procedural history

Williams's 2013 federal habeas petition was dismissed as second or successive after the magistrate judge concluded that a Pennsylvania sentence modification was not a new judgment. Williams did not appeal that dismissal, but later sought authorization to file additional successive petitions and pursued related appellate relief, all unsuccessful. In 2022, he moved under Rule 60(b)(1) to reopen the dismissal based on Magwood v. Patterson and Lesko v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Because the motion was untimely under Rule 60(b)(1), the magistrate judge recharacterized it under Rule 60(b)(6); the District Court denied relief, and the Third Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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