Cote v. Travis

C.A. No. 23-346 WES (D.R.I. July 22, 2025) · United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island · July 22, 2025 · No. C.A. No. 23-346 WES

Summary

This Memorandum and Order from the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island addresses a plaintiff's First Amendment and false arrest claims against city council members and the City of Warwick after he was removed from a public comment period at a council meeting. The court grants summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on personal capacity claims, holding that they are protected by absolute legislative immunity for enforcing meeting rules during legislative proceedings. However, the court denies summary judgment regarding official capacity claims and municipal liability, finding that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether the city's policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation. The court also denies the plaintiff's motion to defer summary judgment pending discovery.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
Writing for the Court
William E. Smith
Jurisdiction
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
Decision date
July 22, 2025
Docket number
C.A. No. 23-346 WES
Procedural posture
Plaintiff brought First Amendment, retaliation, and false-arrest claims against individual city council members, city officials, and the City of Warwick. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to defer ruling to permit discovery.
Standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and considered whether Rule 56(d) relief was warranted.
Precedential value
unpublished district court memorandum and order; persuasive only
Disposition
other

Topics

first amendmentfree speechsection 1983summary judgmentcivil procedure

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightscivil proceduremunicipal law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Travis's interpretation and enforcement of the City Council's decorum rule during a public-comment period constituted protected legislative activity warranting absolute legislative immunity in her personal capacity.
  2. Whether the present City Council members were entitled to absolute legislative immunity for failing to appeal or intervene in Travis's ruling.
  3. Whether the City of Warwick was entitled to summary judgment on Cote's First Amendment claims because he could not establish a municipal policy or custom.
  4. Whether Stephen McAllister, sued solely in his official capacity, was entitled to summary judgment because he was absent from the meeting.
  5. Whether all defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Cote's false-arrest claim because he was not detained or arrested.
  6. Whether Cote was entitled to additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).

Holdings

  1. A local legislator's interpretation and enforcement of a facially nondiscriminatory rule governing a city council's public-comment period falls within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and is protected by absolute legislative immunity in the legislator's personal capacity.
  2. The present Councilmembers were entitled to absolute legislative immunity in their personal capacities because the alleged liability was based on the same enforcement of Rule 1 and failure to appeal or intervene in that ruling.
  3. The City was not entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claims because a single unconstitutional decision by a final municipal policymaker, or an unwritten practice of excluding critics from public comment, could support municipal liability under Section 1983.
  4. McAllister was not entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claims merely because he was absent from the meeting, because an official-capacity suit may seek equitable prospective relief against the official responsible for the governmental position.
  5. All defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the false-arrest claim because the undisputed facts showed that Cote was not arrested or detained: he was ordered to leave, but a reasonable person would have understood that he was free to leave rather than unable to do so.
  6. Cote was not entitled to deferment or additional discovery under Rule 56(d) because the requested material would not have affected the court's conclusions.

Key quotations

The bottom line is this: Travis’s act of interpreting and enforcing Rule 1 against Cote was “taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’” (Section III.A.1)
On the undisputed facts, no reasonable person in Cote’s shoes would have believed that he was unable to leave, considering that is exactly what he was asked to do. (Section III.C)
For all the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Cote’s Discovery Motion, Dkt. No. 42, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion, Dkt. No. 35. (Conclusion)

Factual background

Cote attempted to speak during the July 17, 2023, public-comment period of a Warwick City Council meeting about matters he believed concerned Councilmember Donna Travis's ethics and city government. Travis, serving as president pro tempore, directed him to remain on topic and ordered that he be removed; law enforcement escorted him from the meeting. Cote was later invited to address the council and subsequently spoke at multiple public-comment periods without interruption.

Procedural history

Cote commenced the action on August 28, 2023, and filed an amended complaint asserting four counts. Defendants moved for summary judgment; Cote opposed and sought additional discovery under Rule 56(d). The court denied the discovery motion, granted summary judgment in part, and denied it in part.

Court Document

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