Summary
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied without prejudice Peter N. Dior’s second motion for appointment of counsel in his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The court held that indigence alone did not constitute exceptional circumstances and found that the likelihood of success was unclear because the amended complaint had not yet been screened, while the plaintiff appeared able to articulate his claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Plaintiff was entitled to appointment of counsel because he was indigent.
- Whether exceptional circumstances warranted the court's request for voluntary counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
- Whether Local Rule 182 authorized appointment of counsel.
Holdings
- A prisoner is not entitled to appointment of counsel in a civil rights action merely because he is indigent or unable to afford an attorney.
- Exceptional circumstances require evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the plaintiff's ability to articulate claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues; Plaintiff did not establish exceptional circumstances at this stage.
- Local Rule 182 does not authorize appointment of counsel; it addresses appearances and withdrawals of counsel.
Key quotations
“Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action” (at 1)
“in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1).” (at 1)
“Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED, without prejudice.” (at 2)
Factual background
Plaintiff was proceeding pro se and had been received as indigent by the court. He argued that counsel had to be appointed under Local Rule 182 and because he could not afford an attorney. His amended complaint had not yet been screened, while a cursory review of the original and amended complaints indicated that he could articulate the claims at issue.
Procedural history
Plaintiff filed this prisoner civil rights action and submitted original and amended complaints. The amended complaint had not yet been screened when Plaintiff filed his second motion for appointment of counsel on October 15, 2025. The court denied the motion without prejudice.