Summary
This district court order grants a motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in a Social Security disability benefits appeal. The court determined that the requested fee of $17,155.75, calculated as 25% of the plaintiff's past-due benefits, was reasonable given the favorable outcome and time expended by counsel. Additionally, the order mandates that counsel refund the smaller Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fee award to the plaintiff to avoid double compensation.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the attorney‑fee motion filed under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) was timely.
- Whether the requested fee of 25% of past‑due benefits is permissible and reasonable under the statutory limit and Gisbrecht factors.
Holdings
- The motion was timely because it was filed within fourteen days of the notice of award, well within the district’s thirty‑day reasonable‑time window.
- The fee is permissible because it does not exceed the statutory ceiling of 25% of past‑due benefits and is reasonable under the Gisbrecht factors.
Key quotations
“Counsel’s requested fee does not exceed either the contractual agreement for 25% of Plaintiff’s past‑due benefits or the limits of § 406(b). Applying the Gisbrecht factors, the Court concludes that the requested fee is reasonable.” (at 807-08)
“A request for fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) must employ the relief provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to ensure timeliness.” (at 505)
Factual background
Plaintiff was awarded past‑due Social Security benefits after the Commissioner found she had been disabled since May 19, 2018. Plaintiff retained counsel under a contingency agreement for 25% of any past‑due benefits. The Commissioner withheld $17,155.75 from the award to pay attorney fees.
Procedural history
Plaintiff appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits; the district court reversed and remanded on March 27, 2023, awarding past‑due benefits. Plaintiff then filed a motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The Commissioner did not object.