Smith v. Murray

477 U.S. 527 (1986) · Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 1986 · No. No. 85-5487

Summary

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his constitutional challenge to the admission of psychiatric testimony by deliberately failing to raise the claim on direct appeal in state court. The Court concluded that counsel's tactical decision did not constitute cause, and that the record did not establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice warranting review despite the capital sentence. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the federal habeas corpus petition.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Justice O'Connor; Chief Justice Burger; Justice Brennan; Justice White; Justice Marshall; Justice Blackmun; Justice Stevens; Justice Rehnquist; Justice Powell
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
June 26, 1986
Docket number
No. 85-5487
Procedural posture
Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief from his Virginia capital conviction and death sentence, arguing that the prosecution's use of statements made during a psychiatric examination violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of the dismissal of the habeas petition.
Standard of review
Federal habeas review of a constitutional claim defaulted under a state procedural rule requires cause for the default and actual prejudice, subject to an exception where failure to review would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Precedential value
Published United States Supreme Court opinion; binding precedent
Parties
Smith v. Murray, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

federal habeas corpusstate post-conviction reliefappellate procedurefifth amendmentsentencing

Practice areas

Federal habeas corpusCriminal procedureCapital sentencingConstitutional lawAppellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether petitioner could obtain federal habeas review of his constitutional challenge to the prosecution's use of psychiatric-examination testimony after failing to raise that claim on direct appeal in the Virginia courts.
  2. Whether counsel's deliberate tactical decision not to pursue the claim, based on the perceived weakness of Virginia law, constituted cause to excuse the procedural default.
  3. Whether the actual-innocence or fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception permitted review of the defaulted challenge to the capital sentencing proceeding.

Holdings

  1. A federal habeas court evaluates a claim defaulted on direct appeal under the same cause-and-prejudice standards applicable to a claim defaulted at trial; ordinarily, the petitioner must show both cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation.
  2. A deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a constitutional claim on direct appeal does not constitute cause to excuse a state procedural default.
  3. Later decisions that make a constitutional claim easier to establish do not constitute cause unless the legal basis of the claim was genuinely unavailable to counsel when the default occurred.
  4. The exception permitting federal habeas review without cause upon a showing that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person did not apply because the alleged sentencing error did not involve false evidence, prevent development of true facts, or undermine the reliability of the jury's determination of future dangerousness.

Key quotations

Our cases, however, leave no doubt that a deliberate, tactical decision not to pursue a particular claim is the very antithesis of the kind of circumstance that would warrant excusing a defendant's failure to adhere to a State's legitimate rules for the fair and orderly disposition of its criminal cases. (477 U.S. at 534)
This process of "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on" those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. (477 U.S. at 536)
When the alleged error is unrelated to innocence, and when the defendant was represented by competent counsel, had a full and fair opportunity to press his claim in the state system, and yet failed to do so in violation of a legitimate rule of procedure, that burden has not been carried. (477 U.S. at 539)

Factual background

Before trial for the rape and murder of Audrey Weiler, appointed counsel arranged for petitioner to be examined by psychiatrist Dr. Wendell Pile in connection with possible psychiatric defenses. During the examination, petitioner disclosed a prior attempted sexual assault, and Dr. Pile's report was sent to the court, defense counsel, and the prosecution without petitioner being advised that his statements could be used against him or that he had a right to remain silent and have counsel present. At the capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution elicited Dr. Pile's testimony about the incident as evidence of future dangerousness, and the jury recommended death.

Procedural history

After petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Petitioner later raised the constitutional challenge to psychiatric testimony for the first time in state habeas proceedings, where it was held procedurally barred; the Supreme Court of Virginia declined review. The federal district court denied habeas relief under Wainwright v. Sykes, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that any error was irrelevant under Zant v. Stephens. The Supreme Court affirmed because petitioner had procedurally defaulted the claim and failed to show cause for the default.

Court Document

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