Summary
The Supreme Court recognized a federal common-law government contractor defense that can preempt state-law design-defect claims involving military equipment. The defense applies when the United States approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to those specifications, and the supplier warned the government about known dangers not known to it. The Court vacated and remanded because it was unclear whether the Court of Appeals had properly assessed whether a reasonable jury could find the defense inapplicable.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether federal common law recognizes a government-contractor defense that displaces state tort liability for design defects in military equipment.
- What elements must a government contractor establish to invoke that defense.
- Whether the court of appeals could enter judgment for the contractor without a new trial and whether it improperly resolved factual questions concerning the defense instead of conducting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry.
Holdings
- Federal common law displaces state-law liability for design defects in military equipment when imposing state liability would create a significant conflict with uniquely federal interests in government procurement and discretionary military design decisions.
- A contractor is not liable under state law for a design defect in military equipment when: (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use of the equipment known to the supplier but not to the United States.
- Whether the evidence establishes the conditions of the government-contractor defense is a question for the jury; an appellate court may enter judgment only if, under the properly formulated defense, no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.
Key quotations
“Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” (512)
“The latter, which is what petitioner asserts occurred, would be error, since whether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury.” (513-514)
Factual background
David A. Boyle, a Marine helicopter copilot, died after a CH-53D helicopter crashed during a training exercise off Virginia Beach. Although he survived the impact, he drowned because he could not escape from the submerged helicopter. His father alleged that Sikorsky defectively repaired the helicopter's automatic flight-control servo and defectively designed the copilot's escape system, including an outward-opening hatch and obstructed access to its handle.
Procedural history
After the helicopter crash, petitioner sued Sikorsky, a division of United Technologies, alleging negligent repair of the flight-control system and defective design of the emergency escape hatch. The district court submitted both theories to the jury, which found for petitioner; it denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying Virginia law to the repair claim and federal military-contractor-defense principles to the design claim. The Supreme Court held that the military contractor defense exists under federal common law but remanded because it was unclear whether the court of appeals had properly conducted a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review or had impermissibly resolved factual questions itself.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded to the Fourth Circuit to clarify whether it had determined that no reasonable jury could find the government-contractor defense inapplicable. If that was the court's determination, its judgment was to stand; otherwise, the court was to conduct the proper sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry.