Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

505 U.S. 1003 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · June 29, 1992 · No. No. 91-453

Summary

The United States Supreme Court considered whether South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act effected a taking by prohibiting construction on two beachfront lots owned by David Lucas. The Court held that a regulation depriving property of all economically beneficial use requires compensation unless the prohibited use was not part of the owner's title under background principles of state property or nuisance law. The case was remanded for further proceedings concerning the applicability of that exception and related issues.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Justice Scalia; Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice White; Justice O'Connor; Justice Thomas; Justice Kennedy; Justice Blackmun; Justice Stevens; Justice Souter
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
June 29, 1992
Docket number
No. 91-453
Procedural posture
Petitioner sought review of a South Carolina Supreme Court decision reversing a trial-court judgment that the Beachfront Management Act effected a taking of his property requiring just compensation.
Standard of review
The Court accepted the state trial court's factual finding that the parcels were rendered valueless and reviewed the constitutional takings question de novo. It also considered whether the claim was ripe in light of the later special-permit amendment.
Precedential value
binding
Parties
David H. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

takings clauseeminent domainreal estateenvironmental lawremedies

Practice areas

constitutional lawreal estateenvironmental laweminent domainremedies

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a land-use regulation that deprives private property of all economically beneficial or productive use effects a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  2. Whether a total regulatory taking requires compensation when the prohibited use was not already barred by background principles of state property or nuisance law.
  3. Whether Lucas's takings claim concerning the period before the 1990 special-permit amendment was sufficiently ripe for review.

Holdings

  1. When a regulation deprives land of all economically beneficial or productive use, it effects a compensable taking under the Takings Clause unless the prohibited use interests were not part of the owner's title because background principles of state property or nuisance law already prohibited them.
  2. A legislature's characterization of a regulated use as harmful or noxious, standing alone, does not establish that a regulation eliminating all economically beneficial use is noncompensable.
  3. The availability of a later-created discretionary special-permit procedure did not require Lucas to pursue that procedure before seeking review of his claim concerning the prior period of allegedly unconditional deprivation.

Key quotations

while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. (1014)
A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. (1026)
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. (1029)
As we have said, a "State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . ." (1031-1032)

Factual background

In 1986, David Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina, intending to build single-family homes. In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited permanent habitable structures seaward of a statutory setback line; the Coastal Council placed the baseline landward of Lucas's parcels. The state trial court found that the prohibition eliminated all reasonable economic use and rendered the lots valueless, although the Act permitted some nonhabitable improvements and was later amended to authorize special permits in certain circumstances.

Procedural history

Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms and sued in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas after the Beachfront Management Act prohibited construction of permanent habitable structures on the lots. After a bench trial, the court found that the regulation deprived the lots of all reasonable economic use, rendered them valueless, and ordered the Coastal Council to pay compensation. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding that no compensation was due because the regulation was designed to prevent serious public harm. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded.

Remand instructions

The case was remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. South Carolina was required to identify background principles of nuisance and property law that independently prohibited Lucas's intended uses under the circumstances, if it sought to avoid compensation. The state court was also to address issues left unresolved by its categorical disposition, including the consequences of the amended permit regime and any temporary taking.

Court Document

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