Godinez v. Moran

509 U.S. 389 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · June 24, 1993 · No. No. 92-725

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the standard for competency to stand trial. The Court explained that, although a defendant must also make a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights, due process does not require a heightened competency standard.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Justice Thomas; Chief Justice Rehnquist; Justice White; Justice O'Connor; Justice Souter; Justice Scalia; Justice Kennedy; Justice Blackmun; Justice Stevens
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
June 24, 1993
Docket number
No. 92-725
Procedural posture
Federal habeas corpus review of a state criminal conviction and death sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's holding that a defendant must satisfy a heightened competency standard before waiving counsel or pleading guilty.
Standard of review
The Supreme Court reviewed the legal question concerning the constitutionally required competency standard de novo on certiorari review.
Precedential value
binding
Parties
Godinez, Warden v. Moran
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

criminal procedureright to counselfederal habeas corpusdue processpost-conviction relief

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawfederal habeas corpusright to counselpost-conviction relief

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty is higher than the competency standard for standing trial.
  2. Whether the competency standard for waiving the right to counsel and proceeding without counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial.
  3. Whether due process requires a competency determination whenever a defendant seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel, or only when the court has reason to doubt the defendant's competence.

Holdings

  1. The competency standard for pleading guilty is not higher than, or different from, the Dusky standard for competency to stand trial.
  2. A defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel is measured by the same competency standard applicable to standing trial; the defendant need not satisfy a higher standard of mental functioning or demonstrate competence to conduct a technically proficient defense.
  3. Although no heightened competency standard applies, a court must additionally determine that a defendant's waiver of counsel and guilty plea are knowing and voluntary.
  4. A competency determination is required when the court has reason to doubt the defendant's competence, but due process does not require a competency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel.

Key quotations

We hold that it is not. (at 391)
the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself. (at 399)
In this sense there is a “heightened” standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence. (at 401-402)
Thus, Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. (at 402)

Factual background

Moran shot and killed three people in Nevada, wounded himself in a suicide attempt, and later confessed. After psychiatric evaluations found him competent to stand trial, he sought to discharge counsel, represent himself, and plead guilty to prevent mitigating evidence from being presented at sentencing. The trial court found him competent and determined that his waiver of counsel and guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Procedural history

Moran pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree murder after waiving counsel and was sentenced to death for each murder. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the sentences for the saloon murders, reversed the sentence for the ex-wife's murder, and remanded for a sentence of life without parole. State postconviction relief was denied, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal District Court denied habeas relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered issuance of the writ unless Nevada permitted Moran to withdraw his pleas and proceed to trial with counsel.

Remand instructions

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Court Document

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