Summary
The United States Supreme Court held that defense counsel's decision to concede a capital defendant's guilt without obtaining the defendant's express consent does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court ruled that the claim must generally be evaluated under the Strickland v. Washington standard rather than the Cronic presumption-of-prejudice framework. The Court reversed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the case.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether defense counsel's failure to obtain a capital defendant's express consent before conceding guilt at trial automatically establishes deficient performance.
- Whether counsel's concession of guilt constituted the functional equivalent of a guilty plea requiring the defendant's affirmative, explicit acceptance.
- Whether counsel's concession of guilt triggered the presumed-prejudice rule under United States v. Cronic or instead had to be evaluated under Strickland v. Washington.
Holdings
- When counsel informs a defendant of a proposed strategy of conceding guilt and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel is not subject to a blanket rule requiring the defendant's explicit consent before pursuing that strategy. Counsel must consult with the defendant about important strategic decisions, but need not obtain consent to every tactical decision.
- Counsel's concession of guilt in Nixon's full trial was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and therefore did not require Nixon's affirmative, explicit acceptance.
- Counsel's concession of guilt did not, on this record, constitute a complete failure to function as the prosecution's adversary, so the presumed-prejudice rule of Cronic did not apply. The claim had to be evaluated under Strickland's ordinary deficient-performance and prejudice requirements.
Key quotations
“But when a defendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects to the course counsel describes as the most promising means to avert a sentence of death, counsel is not automatically barred from pursuing that course.” (543 U.S. at 178-179)
“When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent.” (543 U.S. at 192)
Factual background
Nixon was charged with the kidnapping and exceptionally brutal murder of Jeanne Bickner, and the evidence of guilt included Nixon's detailed confession, eyewitness testimony, physical evidence, and testimony from his brother and girlfriend. His appointed capital-defense counsel concluded that guilt was not reasonably disputable and that contesting guilt could undermine mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Counsel explained this strategy to Nixon several times, but Nixon remained unresponsive and neither expressly consented to nor objected to the strategy. Counsel conceded guilt during jury selection, opening statement, and closing argument, while preserving cross-examination, evidentiary objections, and appellate rights; the jury convicted Nixon and recommended death.
Procedural history
Nixon was convicted in Florida state court of first-degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately held that counsel's concession of guilt without the defendant's affirmative, explicit acceptance constituted presumptively inadequate assistance and remanded for a new trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded for further proceedings under the proper ineffective-assistance standards.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded to the Florida Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, including application of the Strickland standard rather than an automatic presumption of deficient performance and prejudice.