Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) · Supreme Court of the United States · May 16, 2016 · No. No. 13-1339

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s Article III standing analysis was incomplete because it considered whether the alleged injury was particularized but failed to address whether it was concrete. A statutory violation does not automatically establish standing absent a concrete injury, although an intangible harm or risk of real harm may suffice in appropriate circumstances. The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further consideration of whether the alleged Fair Credit Reporting Act violations created a sufficient risk of harm.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Justice Alito; Chief Justice Roberts; Justice Kennedy; Justice Thomas; Justice Breyer; Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan; Justice Ginsburg
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
May 16, 2016
Docket number
No. 13-1339
Procedural posture
The District Court dismissed Robins's FCRA class-action complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Robins adequately alleged injury in fact. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded.
Standard of review
At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element of Article III standing; the Court reviewed the sufficiency of the alleged injury in fact.
Precedential value
binding
Parties
Spokeo, Inc. v. Thomas Robins
Disposition
vacated

Topics

standingsubject matter jurisdictionconsumer protectionconstitutional lawstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil procedureconsumer protectionfair credit reporting

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff alleging a statutory violation has Article III standing without alleging a concrete injury in fact.
  2. Whether the Ninth Circuit properly analyzed both the particularization and concreteness components of the injury-in-fact requirement.
  3. Whether the particular procedural violations alleged under the FCRA entailed a sufficient degree of risk to constitute a concrete injury.

Holdings

  1. An injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; a plaintiff cannot establish Article III standing merely by alleging a statutory violation or a bare procedural violation divorced from any concrete harm.
  2. The Ninth Circuit's injury-in-fact analysis was incomplete because it considered particularization but failed to consider whether the alleged procedural violations were sufficiently concrete.

Key quotations

An injury in fact must also be “concrete.” (136 S. Ct. at 1548)
Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. (136 S. Ct. at 1549)
A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm. (136 S. Ct. at 1550)

Factual background

Spokeo operates an online people-search engine that gathers and disseminates personal information from multiple databases. Robins alleged that Spokeo's profile about him inaccurately stated, among other things, that he was married, had children, was in his 50s, had a job, was relatively affluent, and held a graduate degree. He alleged that Spokeo willfully failed to comply with the FCRA's requirements concerning the accuracy and handling of consumer reports and that the misinformation harmed his employment prospects.

Procedural history

Robins filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that Spokeo willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by disseminating inaccurate information about him. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to plead injury in fact. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Robins alleged violations of his own statutory rights and individualized interests. The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit's standing analysis was incomplete because it addressed particularization but not concreteness.

Remand instructions

The Ninth Circuit was instructed to determine whether the particular procedural violations alleged by Robins entailed a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement of Article III and to conduct a complete injury-in-fact analysis.

Court Document

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