Summary
The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not provide detained aliens with a statutory right to periodic bond hearings during immigration detention. The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had improperly invoked the constitutional-avoidance canon to impose implicit six-month limits and hearing requirements, reversed the judgment, and remanded for consideration of the respondents’ constitutional claims and class-certification issues.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) implicitly require periodic bond hearings during prolonged immigration detention.
- Whether the Ninth Circuit properly invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe those provisions as imposing a six-month detention limit and periodic bond hearings.
- Whether 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) or 1226(e) deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' statutory and constitutional challenges.
- Whether the case should be remanded for consideration of respondents' constitutional claims and whether the certified class could continue to litigate those claims.
Holdings
- Sections 1225(b)(1) and 1225(b)(2) mandate detention of covered applicants for admission until the applicable asylum or removal proceedings conclude, subject to the statute's express release provisions, and do not require periodic bond hearings or impose an implicit six-month detention limit.
- Section 1226(c) mandates detention of covered criminal and terrorist aliens during removal proceedings and permits release before the proceedings conclude only for the statute's expressly stated witness-protection purposes; it does not require periodic bond hearings or impose an implicit six-month limit.
- Section 1226(a) does not require periodic bond hearings every six months, does not require the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary, and does not require consideration of the duration of prior detention in deciding whether to release an alien.
- Sections 1252(b)(9) and 1226(e) did not bar the Court from considering respondents' statutory challenge to the detention framework. Section 1252(b)(9) does not encompass these challenges to detention authority, and § 1226(e) bars challenges to discretionary detention decisions but not challenges to the statutory framework authorizing detention.
- The Court declined to decide respondents' constitutional claims and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to consider those claims in the first instance and to reexamine whether the class could continue litigating them.
Key quotations
“But a court relying on that canon still must interpret the statute, not rewrite it.” (583 U.S. ___, slip op. at 2)
“Read most naturally, §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” (583 U.S. ___, slip op. at 13)
“We hold that §1226(c) mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings “only if ” the alien is released for witness-protection purposes.” (583 U.S. ___, slip op. at 22)
“Nothing in §1226(a)’s text—which says only that the Attorney General “may release” the alien “on . . . bond”—even remotely supports the imposition of either of those requirements.” (583 U.S. ___, slip op. at 23)
Factual background
Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident since 1987, was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 after convictions for a drug offense and vehicle theft while the Government pursued his removal. He and a certified class of immigration detainees alleged that §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) did not authorize prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings. The District Court entered a permanent injunction requiring such hearings, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Procedural history
Rodriguez, a lawful permanent resident detained during removal proceedings, filed a habeas petition challenging prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing. His case was consolidated with Garcia's, and the District Court certified subclasses of immigration detainees and entered a permanent injunction requiring bond hearings after six months, with the Government bearing the burden by clear and convincing evidence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, construing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) to contain an implicit six-month detention limit and § 1226(a) to require periodic bond hearings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Remand instructions
The Ninth Circuit must consider respondents' constitutional arguments in the first instance and reexamine whether respondents may continue litigating as a class. It should consider 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), whether classwide injunctive or declaratory relief remains available, whether the class remains appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) in light of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and whether common-facts class litigation is appropriate for the Due Process Clause claims.