Summary
The Supreme Court held that a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction depends on the totality of the circumstances and does not require an actual agreement between the parents, including for infants. The Court also held that a first-instance habitual-residence determination is reviewed on appeal for clear error. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was affirmed.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether an actual agreement between parents is categorically necessary to establish an infant's habitual residence under the Hague Convention.
- Whether a first-instance determination of a child's habitual residence is reviewed de novo or deferentially for clear error.
- Whether the judgment affirming the child's return should be disturbed or remanded for application of the totality-of-the-circumstances standard.
Holdings
- A child's habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. No categorical requirement, including an actual agreement between the parents, is necessary to establish an infant's habitual residence.
- A first-instance habitual-residence determination is reviewed deferentially for clear error.
- The judgment of the Sixth Circuit should be affirmed without remand because the District Court had a complete factual record, neither party sought remand, and no additional factual development was identified.
Key quotations
“We hold that a child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. An actual agreement between the parents is not necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence.” (at 2)
“We further hold that a first-instance habitual-residence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error.” (at 2)
“The bottom line: There are no categorical requirements for establishing a child’s habitual residence—least of all an actual-agreement requirement for infants.” (at 11)
“The habitual-residence determination thus presents a task for factfinding courts, not appellate courts, and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard deferential to the factfinding court.” (at 15)
Factual background
Michelle Monasky and Domenico Taglieri married in the United States and later relocated to Italy, where they established a marital home and both found work. After the marriage deteriorated and Monasky alleged physical abuse, their daughter was born in Italy in February 2015. Monasky fled Italy with the two-month-old child to Ohio, and Taglieri sought the child's return under the Hague Convention. The District Court found that the child was habitually resident in Italy based on the circumstances surrounding the family's life there and ordered her return.
Procedural history
Taglieri petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio under ICARA for the return of the parties' infant daughter to Italy. After a four-day bench trial, the District Court found that Italy was the child's habitual residence and ordered her return. A divided Sixth Circuit panel and then the en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying a shared-parental-intent framework and clear-error review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the standard for determining habitual residence and the appropriate appellate standard of review, and affirmed.