Summary
The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the 'use' of 'physical force' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause for defining a 'crime of violence.' Consequently, New York second-degree murder, which can be committed by omission, qualifies as a crime of violence for federal sentencing purposes. The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision upholding the defendant's conviction under the firearm enhancement statute.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death by omission necessarily involves the use of physical force under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
- Whether New York attempted second-degree murder, and a VICAR attempted-murder offense predicated on it, qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
Holdings
- The knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death, whether by affirmative act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A).
- New York second-degree murder, and a VICAR attempted-murder offense predicated on New York second-degree murder, is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
Key quotations
“The Second Circuit correctly held that causing bodily harm by omission requires the use of force.” (429)
“Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by extension, Delligatti's VICAR offense premised on it—is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause.” (433)
“As a matter of both text and precedent, deliberately causing injury or death by omission is a use of physical force.” (438)
Factual background
Delligatti recruited gang members to kill Joseph Bonelli, a suspected police informant, and provided them with a car and a loaded revolver. The gang members twice traveled toward Bonelli's home to carry out the killing but abandoned the first attempt because of potential witnesses and were arrested before the second attempt. Delligatti was convicted of several offenses, including violating § 924(c) based on attempted murder under the VICAR statute, predicated on New York attempted second-degree murder.
Procedural history
Delligatti was charged with using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence, with attempted murder under the VICAR statute predicated on New York second-degree murder serving as the predicate offense. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his pretrial motion to dismiss, a jury convicted him on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that New York attempted second-degree murder qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.