Summary
The Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death by omission necessarily constitutes the 'use' of 'physical force' under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)(A). Applying the categorical approach and relying on prior precedent, the Court concluded that New York attempted second-degree murder qualifies as a predicate 'crime of violence' even when committed through deliberate inaction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use of physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
- Whether the answer changes when the injury or death is caused by omission rather than affirmative action.
- Whether attempted second-degree murder under New York law, and a VICAR offense predicated on that offense, qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).
Holdings
- The knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use of physical force within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The use of physical force under § 924(c)(3)(A) is not limited to affirmative acts; deliberately causing bodily injury or death through omission can constitute a use of physical force against another person.
- New York second-degree murder qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because it requires proof that the defendant intentionally caused the death of another person, including when causation occurs through omission.
- Because the VICAR attempted-murder offense was predicated on New York attempted second-degree murder, which qualifies as a crime of violence, Delligatti's § 924(c) challenge fails.
Key quotations
“The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.” (604 U.S. at 423)
“It is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force under §924(c).” (604 U.S. at 427)
“Whenever an offender deliberately causes bodily harm by omission, he necessarily makes another person the conscious object of physical force.” (604 U.S. at 435)
Factual background
A gas station owner hired Delligatti to kill Joseph Bonelli, a suspected police informant. Delligatti recruited gang members, provided them with a car and a loaded revolver, and urged them to carry out the killing after their first attempt was abandoned. Police discovered the plot and arrested the gang members before the planned shooting. Delligatti was convicted under the VICAR statute of attempted murder and under § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence.
Procedural history
Delligatti was charged and convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of several offenses, including using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence under § 924(c). The District Court denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the § 924(c) charge and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that attempted second-degree murder under New York law, and a VICAR offense predicated on that offense, qualified as a crime of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed.