Summary
The Supreme Court held that a sentence has not been imposed for purposes of § 403(b) of the First Step Act when the defendant’s prior sentence has been vacated. Accordingly, the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants who require resentencing after the enactment of the Act, even if they were previously sentenced before its enactment. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the cases.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a defendant whose pre-First Step Act § 924(c) sentence was later vacated is a defendant upon whom a sentence 'has not been imposed' under § 403(b) of the First Step Act.
- Whether the First Step Act's reduced § 924(c) mandatory minimum penalties apply at a post-Act resentencing following vacatur of the defendant's pre-Act sentence.
Holdings
- For purposes of § 403(b), a sentence has been imposed if and only if it remains extant and has not been vacated.
- The First Step Act's reduced § 924(c) penalties apply to first-time § 924(c) offenders who are sentenced after the Act's enactment, including defendants whose prior § 924(c) sentences were vacated and who must be resentenced.
Key quotations
“We hold that, under that circumstance, a sentence "has not been imposed" for purposes of § 403(b). Thus, the First Step Act's more lenient penalties apply.” (423)
“we conclude that a sentence has been imposed for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant” (427)
“A judge would thus correctly conclude at resentencing that, if an offender's past sentence has been vacated, a sentence "has not been imposed" upon that offender for purposes of the First Step Act” (433)
“all first-time § 924(c) offenders who appear for sentencing after the First Step Act's enactment date—including those whose previous § 924(c) sentences have been vacated and who thus need to be resentenced—are subject to the Act's revised penalties.” (440)
Factual background
In 2009, Hewitt, Duffey, and Ross were convicted of multiple bank-robbery and conspiracy offenses and corresponding § 924(c) firearm offenses. Although first-time offenders, each received a five-year mandatory minimum for the first § 924(c) count and stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for later counts, producing sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions and sentences were vacated on direct review and the petitioners were resentenced, later post-conviction proceedings based on United States v. Davis resulted in vacatur of additional § 924(c) convictions and their sentences. At post-Act resentencing, the District Court applied the pre-Act stacking penalties, and each petitioner received a sentence of at least 130 years.
Procedural history
Petitioners were convicted in federal district court of bank robbery, conspiracy, and multiple 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses and received stacked mandatory minimum sentences. After direct appeals, resentencing, and later successful successive post-conviction proceedings following United States v. Davis, the District Court vacated the affected § 924(c) convictions and the petitioners' sentences, then resentenced them under the pre-First Step Act scheme. The Fifth Circuit denied the parties' joint request for vacatur, holding that § 403(b) did not apply because petitioners had been sentenced before the Act's enactment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Remand instructions
The Fifth Circuit's contrary judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding that the First Step Act's revised § 924(c) penalties apply at petitioners' post-Act resentencings.