Summary
This Supreme Court opinion determines whether defendants sentenced prior to the enactment of the First Step Act qualify for its reduced mandatory minimum penalties for firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) when their original sentences were subsequently vacated and they face resentencing after the Act's effective date. Relying on the present-perfect tense used in Section 403(b) and established legal principles regarding the void ab initio effect of vacatur, the Court concluded that a vacated sentence is not considered "imposed" for retroactivity purposes. Consequently, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case, holding that the more lenient penalties apply at post-Act resentencing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether § 403(b) of the First Step Act applies to a defendant who was sentenced before the Act's enactment but whose sentence was later vacated and who therefore requires resentencing after enactment.
- Whether a sentence that was previously imposed but later vacated qualifies as a sentence that 'has not been imposed' under § 403(b) of the First Step Act.
Holdings
- Under § 403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence 'has . . . been imposed' only if it remains extant and has not been vacated. Therefore, a defendant whose pre-Act § 924(c) sentence was later vacated and who is resentenced after the Act's enactment is eligible for the Act's reduced mandatory minimum penalties.
Key quotations
“We hold that, under that circumstance, a sentence “has not been imposed” for purposes of §403(b). Thus, the First Step Act’s more lenient penalties apply.” (slip op. at 2)
“a sentence has been imposed for purposes of that provision if, and only if, the sentence is extant—i.e., has not been vacated.” (slip op. at 6)
“A judge would thus correctly conclude at resentencing that, if an offender’s past sentence has been vacated, a sentence “has not been imposed” upon that offender for purposes of the First Step Act” (slip op. at 12)
“From the Act’s enactment date onward, sentencing judges impose the First Step Act’s lessened mandatory minimums for any first-time §924(c) offender—full stop.” (slip op. at 19)
Factual background
In 2009, Hewitt, Duffey, and Ross were convicted of multiple bank robbery and conspiracy offenses and corresponding § 924(c) firearm offenses. Although first-time offenders, each received a five-year mandatory minimum for the first § 924(c) count and stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for later counts, producing sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions and sentences were vacated on direct appeal, the district court resentenced them in 2012. Following the Supreme Court's 2019 decision in Davis, additional § 924(c) convictions and the petitioners' sentences were vacated, requiring resentencing after enactment of the First Step Act.
Procedural history
Petitioners were convicted in federal district court of bank-robbery-related offenses and multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), receiving stacked mandatory minimum sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions were vacated on direct appeal, the district court resentenced them in 2012 to terms between 285 and 305 years. Following United States v. Davis, the district court vacated additional § 924(c) convictions and the petitioners' sentences, then resentenced them under the pre-First Step Act stacking regime. The Fifth Circuit denied the parties' joint request for vacatur, holding that the First Step Act did not apply because sentences had been imposed before the Act's enactment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Remand instructions
The Fifth Circuit's contrary judgment was reversed, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with the conclusion that the First Step Act's revised penalties apply to petitioners' post-Act resentencings.