McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.

606 U. S. 146 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · June 20, 2025 · No. 23–1226

Summary

The Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's statutory interpretation. Instead, district courts must independently determine the meaning of the statute under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's view. The case arose from a TCPA class-action lawsuit where the District Court had deferred to an FCC order excluding online fax services from the definition of telephone facsimile machines. The Court reversed, emphasizing the default presumption of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Writing for the Court
Kavanaugh; Roberts, C.J.; Thomas; Alito; Gorsuch; Barrett
Jurisdiction
Supreme Court of the United States
Decision date
June 20, 2025
Docket number
23–1226
Procedural posture
Petition for certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Standard of review
de novo
Precedential value
high
Parties
McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.
Disposition
reversed and remanded

Topics

administrative lawjudicial review of agency actionstatutory interpretationcivil procedure

Practice areas

administrative lawcivil procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether district courts in civil enforcement proceedings are bound by the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA under the Hobbs Act.
  2. Whether the Hobbs Act precludes district‑court review of an agency's statutory interpretation in enforcement proceedings.

Holdings

  1. District courts are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute in enforcement proceedings; they must independently determine the meaning of the statute under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation.
  2. The Hobbs Act does not preclude district‑court review of agency interpretations in enforcement proceedings; it only grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction for pre‑enforcement challenges.

Key quotations

The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency's interpretation of a statute. (at 151)
In enforcement proceedings, district courts must independently determine the law's meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation. (at 152)

Factual background

McKesson sent unsolicited fax advertisements to medical practices, including McLaughlin, in 2009‑2010 without the TCPA‑required opt‑out notice. The FCC later issued the Amerifactors order interpreting "telephone facsimile machine" to exclude online fax services. The district court treated that order as binding and granted summary judgment on the online‑fax claims, leaving McLaughlin with damages for only twelve traditional faxes.

Procedural history

McLaughlin sued McKesson in the Northern District of California alleging TCPA violations. The district court granted summary judgment on claims involving online fax services based on an FCC order and decertified the class. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the Hobbs Act binds district courts to the FCC's interpretation.

Remand instructions

Remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Court Document

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