Summary
The Supreme Court held that neither the State of Texas nor a private business qualified as a 'party' entitled to seek judicial review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing decision under the Hobbs Act because they failed to successfully intervene in the agency proceeding. Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Court declined to reach the underlying statutory dispute regarding the Commission's authority to license off-site spent nuclear fuel storage.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Texas and Fasken were parties aggrieved under the Hobbs Act and therefore entitled to judicial review of the NRC's licensing decision.
- Whether submitting comments or attempting unsuccessfully to intervene conferred party status in the NRC licensing proceeding.
- Whether Fasken could collaterally attack the prior D.C. Circuit decision affirming the denial of intervention.
- Whether Texas and Fasken could obtain nonstatutory ultra vires review despite the Hobbs Act's review scheme.
- Whether the NRC possessed statutory authority to license private off-site storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Holdings
- Under the Hobbs Act, only a party aggrieved by the NRC's licensing order may obtain judicial review, and a person becomes a party to an NRC licensing proceeding only by being the license applicant or by successfully intervening.
- Submitting comments on a draft environmental impact statement does not by itself confer party status in an NRC licensing adjudication or permit judicial review of the underlying licensing decision.
- Fasken could not use a new Hobbs Act action challenging the final license to collaterally attack the D.C. Circuit's final decision upholding the denial of its intervention petition.
- Texas and Fasken could not obtain nonstatutory ultra vires review of the NRC's licensing decision.
Key quotations
“That text means that a “person” becomes a “party” only after that person requests to participate in a hearing before the Commission—that is, requests to intervene—and is actually “admit[ted] . . . to such proceeding” by the Commission.” (676–677)
“In short, the Hobbs Act affords judicial review to those who were parties before the Commission.” (680)
“The Kyne exception is a narrow one” (681)
“Texas and Fasken were not parties to the Commission's licensing proceeding and are not entitled to obtain judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision.” (690)
Factual background
Interim Storage Partners applied for an NRC license to construct and operate a private, off-site facility in West Texas for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. Texas and Fasken Land and Minerals submitted comments on the NRC's draft environmental impact statement, and Fasken separately sought to intervene in the licensing proceeding. The NRC denied Fasken intervention and later issued ISP a renewable 40-year license. Texas and Fasken challenged the license in the Fifth Circuit without having been admitted as parties to the NRC licensing proceeding.
Procedural history
Fasken unsuccessfully sought intervention in the NRC licensing proceeding and challenged the denial in the D.C. Circuit, which rejected its challenge. Texas and Fasken later petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the NRC's final licensing decision. The Fifth Circuit reached the merits under an ultra vires theory, held that the NRC lacked statutory authority to issue the license, and vacated the license. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Texas and Fasken were not parties to the NRC proceeding and therefore could not obtain review of the licensing decision under the Hobbs Act.
Remand instructions
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's judgment and remanded with instructions to deny or dismiss the petitions for review.