Summary
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not clearly authorize separate convictions under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) for a single act that violates both provisions. Applying the Blockburger presumption, the Court concluded that §924(j) operates as an alternative to, rather than a supplement to, the §924(c)(1)(A)(i) offense. The Court reversed the relevant portion of the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Congress clearly authorized two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) for a single act that violates both provisions.
- Whether § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)'s consecutive-sentence mandate authorizes cumulative convictions under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j).
Holdings
- Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) for one act that violates both provisions. Because the provisions define the same offense under Blockburger and Congress did not plainly overcome the resulting presumption against cumulative punishment, only one conviction may stand.
- The consecutive-sentence mandate does not authorize two convictions under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j). It addresses the arrangement of sentences after multiple convictions are authorized and does not answer the threshold question whether two convictions may be imposed.
Key quotations
“We resolve the rest by concluding that this presumption holds true here: Congress intended subsection (j) as an alternative, not a supplement, to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i).” (607 U.S. ___, at 2)
“Blockburger addresses the permissibility of multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences.” (607 U.S. ___, at 12)
“Before the consecutive-sentence mandate gains any relevance, a court must first determine whether two punishments (convictions) may be imposed at all.” (607 U.S. ___, at 13)
“that suggests Congress intended to place in front of prosecutors a menu, not a buffet.” (607 U.S. ___, at 17)
Factual background
Barrett participated in a series of robberies between August 2011 and January 2012. During one robbery, his confederate shot and killed Gamar Dafalla. A jury convicted Barrett of Hobbs Act robbery serving as the predicate offense, using or possessing a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and causing death during a § 924(c) violation under § 924(j)(1).
Procedural history
A jury convicted Barrett on seven counts, including Hobbs Act robbery, a § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) firearm offense, and a § 924(j)(1) death-causing offense. After the Supreme Court vacated one unrelated § 924(c) conviction in light of United States v. Davis, the District Court resentenced Barrett. Following Lora v. United States, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, while directing the District Court to impose separate convictions and sentences on the § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) counts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed that portion of the Second Circuit's judgment.
Remand instructions
The Second Circuit's judgment requiring separate convictions and sentences under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and § 924(j) was reversed in relevant part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.