Summary
The Alabama Supreme Court held that a plaintiff proceeding under Ala. Code § 25-5-11(c)(2) need not prove an intent or purpose to injure. The trial court improperly incorporated the heightened scienter requirement from § 25-5-11(c)(1) into its jury instruction concerning the alleged failure to maintain or repair a vehicle’s brakes. The judgment for the coemployee was reversed and the case remanded.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Pettibone had to prove that Tyson had actual knowledge or substantial certainty that an injury would occur, thereby importing the intent-to-injure scienter requirement of Ala. Code § 25-5-11(c)(1) into a claim under § 25-5-11(c)(2).
- Whether the erroneous jury instruction required reversal of the judgment entered on the jury's verdict for Tyson.
Holdings
- A claim under § 25-5-11(c)(2) does not require the plaintiff to prove a purpose, intent, or design to injure, or the actual knowledge or substantial certainty that injury will occur. The statute requires willful and intentional removal, or conduct treated as removal, of a manufacturer-provided safety device with knowledge that injury or death would likely or probably result.
- The failure to maintain and/or repair a safety guard or device provided by a machine's manufacturer is tantamount to removal of the safety guard or device for purposes of § 25-5-11(c)(2).
- The trial court's instruction was an incorrect statement of law that undermined the sole theory of liability presented by Pettibone and constituted reversible error.
Key quotations
“Thus, a court which incorporates the “intent” requirement of subsection (c)(1) into subsection (c)(2) confuses the separate fields of operation that the Legislature intended.” (at 380)
“The trial court’s instruction was an incorrect statement of the law that undermined the sole theory of liability in the plaintiffs case.” (at 381)
“Here, the trial judge erred to reversal in instructing the jury on the fundamental law governing Pettibone’s case.” (at 381)
Factual background
Packard Hughes Interconnect, Inc. employed both Pettibone and Tyson, who was the company's lead maintenance technician responsible for maintaining and timely repairing the company van. On June 12, 1996, the van's brakes failed while Pettibone was driving down a hill, causing a collision in which Pettibone and another driver were severely injured. Evidence showed that another employee had reported the van's brake problems to Tyson on three prior occasions and that Tyson had experienced the same problem himself.
Procedural history
Pettibone sued Tyson, alleging that Tyson's willful failure to maintain or repair the brakes on their employer's van constituted willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(2). The jury returned a verdict for Tyson. Pettibone moved for a new trial, arguing in part that the jury instruction improperly required proof of intent to injure; the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded.
Remand instructions
Remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion, including a new trial using a proper instruction on the scienter required under § 25-5-11(c)(2). The court did not address Pettibone's second appellate issue.